We take stock of the current body of knowledge and understanding on organizational ambidexterity to further specify the construct and develop a typology to focus this line of research. To that end, we first synthesize the various insights on ambidexterity's conceptualization in extant research. We then develop a parsimonious, yet coherent typology that delineates four archetypes of ambidexterity using two primary dimensions underlying previous conceptualizations of this construct. To help focus and align extant research, we next map these types onto the most salient theories, antecedents, and outcomes that are uniquely germane to each. Finally, we offer several recommendations and promising avenues for future inquiries that follow from our typology and associated discussion.

Determining the appropriate level of integration is crucial to realizing value from acquisitions. Most prior research assumes that higher integration implies the removal of autonomy from target managers, which in turn undermines the functioning of the target firm if it entails unfamiliar elements for the acquirer. Using a survey of 86 acquisitions to obtain the richness of detail necessary to distinguish integration from autonomy, the authors argue and find that integration and autonomy are not the opposite ends of a single continuum. Certain conditions (e.g., when complementarity rather than similarity is the primary source of synergy) lead to high levels of both integration and autonomy. In addition, similarity negatively moderates the relationship between complementarity and autonomy when the target offers both synergy sources. In contrast, similarity does not moderate the link between complementarity and integration. The authors’ findings advance scholarly understanding about the drivers of implementation strategy and in particular the different implementation strategies acquiring managers deploy when they attempt to leverage complementarities, similarities, or both.

In contrast to broad generalizations about the short‐termism of managers, this paper explains changes in the temporal orientation of specific firms over time based on performance relative to aspirations and top management team incentives. We gain empirical traction on temporal orientation by measuring the durability of acquired property, plant, and equipment (asset durability) from reported data on depreciation expense. Consistent with predictions, we find that performance relative to aspirations positively influences asset durability. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that stock‐based compensation produces the same effect. Instead, we find stock‐based compensation lowers asset durability. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper examines the conditions under which firms make long horizon investments (i.e., investments that take a long period of time to pay off). We predict firms are constrained from making long horizon investments when short‐term performance is poor—and this effect is especially pronounced for young firms. Moreover, we argue that when managers hold high levels of exercisable stock options, their firms are less likely to make long‐term investments. However, firms are more likely to pursue long horizon investments when managerial stock options are not yet exercisable. Based on analysis of investments made by cable television operators from 1972–1996, we find support for these predictions. In addition to enhancing our understanding of investment choices, these results—derived from the temporally focused analysis of an investment's payoff horizon—suggest that payoff horizon is an important investment attribute in its own right and should be analyzed distinctly from and in addition to other aspects of investments, such as expected return and risk. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper builds and tests the thesis that CEO influence evolves differently for founders and agents. We theorize that at the beginning of their tenures, founder CEOs can pursue market expansion more aggressively than agent CEOs, because they take office with the combination of motivation, power, and requisite knowledge that agent CEOs build over time. Subsequently, however, founder CEOs have less access to the administrative infrastructure necessary to sustain a growing firm, making them less able than agent CEOs to continue market expansion mid‐tenure and more severely constrained by market complexity. A longitudinal study of cable television operators confirms that the firm's market expansion follows an inverted U‐shape for agents and a downward slope for founders, while market complexity reduces market expansion, especially for founders. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.