No abstract

Interest in the potential effects of different systems for organizing work and managing employees on the performance of organizations has a long history in the social sciences. The interest in economics, arguably more recent, reflects a general concern about the sources of competitiveness in organizations. A number of methodological problems have confronted previous attempts to examine the relationship between work practices and the performance of firms. Among the most intractable has been a concern about establishing causation given heterogeneity biases in what have typically been cross-sectional data. The results from prior literature are suggestive of important productivity effects but remain inconclusive. To address the major methodological problems we use a national probability sample of establishments, measures of work practices and performance that are comparable across organizations, and most importantly a unique longitudinal design incorporating data from a period prior to the advent of high performance work practices. Our results suggest that work practices that transfer power to employees, often described as "high performance" practices, may rise productivity, although the statistical case is weak. However, we also find that these work practices on average raise labor costs per employee. The net result is no apparent effect on efficiency, a measure that combines labor costs and labor productivity. While these results do not appear to be consistent with the view that such practices are good for employers, neither do they suggest that such practices harm employers. They are, however, consistent with the view that these practices raise average compensation and hence may be good for employees. Overall, then, the evidence suggests that firms can choose "high road" human resources practices that raise employee compensation without necessarily harming their competitiveness.

We use a unique new data set that combines individual worker data with data on workers' employers to estimate plant-level production functions and wage equations, and thus to compare relative marginal products and relative wages for various groups of workers. The data and empirical framework lead to new evidence on numerous questions regarding the determination of wages, questions that hinge on the relationship between wages and marginal products of workers in different demographic groups. These include race and sex discrimination in wages, the causes of rising wages over the life cycle, and the returns to marriage. First, workers who have ever been married are more productive than never-married workers and are paid accordingly.Second, prime-aged workers (aged 35-54) are equally as productive as younger workers, and in some specifications are estimated to receive higher wages. However, older workers (aged 55+) are less productive than younger workers but are paid more. Third, the data indicate no difference between the relative wage and relative productivity of black workers.Finally, with the exception of managerial and professional occupations, women are paid about 25-35% less than men, but estimated productivity differentials for women are generally no larger than 1570, and significantly smaller than the pay differential.

We revisit the minimum wage-employment debate, which is as old as the Department of Labor. In particular, we assess new studies claiming that the standard panel data approach used in much of the "new minimum wage research" is flawed because it fails to account for spatial heterogeneity. These new studies use research designs intended to control for this heterogeneity and conclude that minimum wages in the United States have not reduced employment. We explore the ability of these research designs to isolate reliable identifying information and test the untested assumptions in this new research about the construction of better control groups. Our evidence points to serious problems with these research designs. Moreover, new evidence based on methods that let the data identify the appropriate control groups leads to stronger evidence of disemployment effects, with teen employment elasticities near -0.3. We conclude that the evidence still shows that minimum wages pose a tradeoff of higher wages for some against job losses for others, and that policymakers need to bear this tradeoff in mind when making decisions about increasing the minimum wage.

No abstract

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Quarterly Panel data on consumer bank deposit interest rates reveal asymmetric impacts of market concentration on the dynamic adjustment of prices to shocks. Banks in concentrated markets are slower to raise interest rates on deposits in response to rising market interest rates, but are faster to reduce them in response to declining market interest rates. Thus, banks with market power skim off surplus on movements in both directions. Since deposit interest rates are inversely related to the price charged by banks for deposits, the results suggest that downward price rigidity and upward price flexibility are a consequence of market concentration. Stigler and Kindahl [1970], well-known for pointing out the potential weaknesses of the early research that relied on published price indices, were the first to investigate these issues using actual transaction price data collected for a wide variety of commodities. A review of recent research employing micro panel data to analyze the determinants and extent of price rigidity can be found in Carlton [1989].3. Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen [1986a, 1986b] attempt to get around this problem by analyzing average price-cost margins. They find an important role for unions in accounting for the relationship between concentration and price dynamics [1986b].

Interest in the potential effects of different systems for organizing work and managing employees on the performance of organizations has a long history in the social sciences. The interest in economics, arguably more recent, reflects a general concern about the sources of competitiveness in organizations. A number of methodological problems have confronted previous attempts to examine the relationship between work practices and the performance of firms. Among the most intractable has been a concern about establishing causation given heterogeneity biases in what have typically been cross-sectional data. The results from prior literature are suggestive of important productivity effects but remain inconclusive. To address the major methodological problems we use a national probability sample of establishments, measures of work practices and performance that are comparable across organizations, and most importantly a unique longitudinal design incorporating data from a period prior to the advent of high performance work practices. Our results suggest that work practices that transfer power to employees, often described as "high performance" practices, may rise productivity, although the statistical case is weak. However, we also find that these work practices on average raise labor costs per employee. The net result is no apparent effect on efficiency, a measure that combines labor costs and labor productivity. While these results do not appear to be consistent with the view that such practices are good for employers, neither do they suggest that such practices harm employers. They are, however, consistent with the view that these practices raise average compensation and hence may be good for employees. Overall, then, the evidence suggests that firms can choose "high road" human resources practices that raise employee compensation without necessarily harming their competitiveness.

No abstract