A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that lower rates also reduce the banks' revenues from non-defaulting loans. This paper shows that when this effect is taken into account, a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains.

A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that lower rates also reduce the banks' revenues from non-defaulting loans. This paper shows that when this effect is taken into account, a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure generally obtains.

We present a model of the relationship between real interest rates, credit spreads, and the structure and risk of the banking system. Banks intermediate between entrepreneurs and investors, and can monitor entrepreneurs' projects. We characterize the equilibrium for a fixed aggregate supply of savings, showing that safer entrepreneurs will be funded by nonmonitoring banks and riskier entrepreneurs by monitoring banks. We show that an increase in savings reduces interest rates and spreads, and increases the relative size of the nonmonitoring banking system and the probability of failure of monitoring banks. We also show that the dynamic version of the model exhibits endogenous boom and bust cycles, and rationalizes the existence of countercyclical risk premia and the connection between low interest rates, tight credit spreads, and the buildup of risks during booms.

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This review reexamines from a theoretical perspective the role of monetary and macroprudential policies in addressing the build-up of risks in the financial system. We construct a stylized general equilibrium model in which the key friction comes from a moral hazard problem in firms’ financing that banks’ equity capital serves to ameliorate. Tight monetary policy is introduced by open market sales of government debt, and tight macroprudential policy by an increase in capital requirements. We show that both policies are useful, but macroprudential policy is more effective in fostering financial stability and leads to higher social welfare.