The Gram-negative bacteria Klebsiella pneumoniae is a major cause of nosocomial infections, primarily among immunocompromised patients. The emergence of strains resistant to carbapenems has left few treatment options, making infection containment critical. In 2011, the U.S. National Institutes of Health Clinical Center experienced an outbreak of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae that affected 18 patients, 11 of whom died. Whole-genome sequencing was performed on K. pneumoniae isolates to gain insight into why the outbreak progressed despite early implementation of infection control procedures. Integrated genomic and epidemiological analysis traced the outbreak to three independent transmissions from a single patient who was discharged 3 weeks before the next case became clinically apparent. Additional genomic comparisons provided evidence for unexpected transmission routes, with subsequent mining of epidemiological data pointing to possible explanations for these transmissions. Our analysis demonstrates that integration of genomic and epidemiological data can yield actionable insights and facilitate the control of nosocomial transmission.

Two ligands have been synthesized by derivatisation of cyanuric chloride: 6-(diethylamino)-2,4-disulfanyl-1,3,5triazine (H 2 SSta) 1 and 6-(diethylamino)-2-hydroxo-4-sulfanyl-1,3,5-triazine (H 2 OSta) 2 have been characterised by X-ray crystallography, which shows intermolecular hydrogen bonding in the solid state, leading to dimers of 1 and ribbons of 2. On reaction with metal salts both ligands undergo oligomerisation reactions. Compound 1 reacts with nickel chloride to form a mononuclear complex, [Ni{(Sta)S(S 2 ta)}] 3. In 3 two triazine ligands have reacted, to form a tetradentate ligand in which two triazine rings are bridged by a sulfur group, with a co-ordinated disulfide group present on one ring and a co-ordinated thiolate on the second. Compound 2 reacts with cobalt() chloride to form a cage complex, [Co 6 NaO(OStaH) This complicated structure contains two polydentate ligands formed by linking triazine groups through a bridging sulfur. The cage contains four cobalt() and two cobalt() sites which are assigned by bond length considerations. The compound [Co(OSta) 3 ] 5 co-crystallises with 4, and its structure has also been determined.

Public health officials have raised concerns that plasmid transfer between Enterobacteriaceae species may spread resistance to carbapenems, an antibiotic class of last resort, thereby rendering common healthcare-associated infections nearly impossible to treat. We performed comprehensive surveillance and genomic sequencing to identify carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae in the NIH Clinical Center patient population and hospital environment in order to to articulate the diversity of carbapenemase-encoding plasmids and survey the mobility of and assess the mobility of these plasmids between bacterial species. We isolated a repertoire of carbapenemase-encoding Enterobacteriaceae, including multiple strains of Klebsiella pneumoniae, Klebsiella oxytoca, Escherichia coli, Enterobacter cloacae, Citrobacter freundii, and Pantoea species. Long-read genome sequencing with full end-to-end assembly revealed that these organisms carry the carbapenem-resistance genes on a wide array of plasmids. Klebsiella pneumoniae and Enterobacter cloacae isolated simultaneously from a single patient harbored two different carbapenemase-encoding plasmids, overriding the epidemiological scenario of plasmid transfer between organisms within this patient. We did, however, find evidence supporting horizontal transfer of carbapenemase-encoding plasmids between Klebsiella pneumoniae, Enterobacter cloacae and Citrobacter freundii in the hospital environment. Our comprehensive sequence data, with full plasmid identification, challenges assumptions about horizontal gene transfer events within patients and identified wider possible connections between patients and the hospital environment. In addition, we identified a new carbapenemase-encoding plasmid of potentially high clinical impact carried by Klebsiella pneumoniae, Escherichia coli, Enterobacter cloacae and Pantoea species, from unrelated patients and the hospital environment.

This report updates US Public Health Service recommendations for the management of healthcare personnel (HCP) who experience occupational exposure to blood and/or other body fluids that might contain human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Although the principles of exposure management remain unchanged, recommended HIV postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) regimens and the duration of HIV follow-up testing for exposed personnel have been updated. This report emphasizes the importance of primary prevention strategies, the prompt reporting and management of occupational exposures, adherence to recommended HIV PEP regimens when indicated for an exposure, expert consultation in management of exposures, follow-up of exposed HCP to improve adherence to PEP, and careful monitoring for adverse events related to treatment, as well as for virologic, immunologic, and serologic signs of infection. To ensure timely postexposure management and administration of HIV PEP, clinicians should consider occupational exposures as urgent medical concerns, and institutions should take steps to ensure that staff are aware of both the importance of and the institutional mechanisms available for reporting and seeking care for such exposures. The following is a summary of recommendations: (1) PEP is recommended when occupational exposures to HIV occur; (2) the HIV status of the exposure source patient should be determined, if possible, to guide need for HIV PEP; (3) PEP medication regimens should be started as soon as possible after occupational exposure to HIV, and they should be continued for a 4-week duration; (4) new recommendation-PEP medication regimens should contain 3 (or more) antiretroviral drugs (listed in Appendix A ) for all occupational exposures to HIV; (5) expert consultation is recommended for any occupational exposures to HIV and at a minimum for situations described in Box 1 ; (6) close follow-up for exposed personnel ( Box 2 ) should be provided that includes counseling, baseline and follow-up HIV testing, and monitoring for drug toxicity; follow-up appointments should begin within 72 hours of an HIV exposure; and (7) new recommendation-if a newer fourth-generation combination HIV p24 antigen-HIV antibody test is utilized for follow-up HIV testing of exposed HCP, HIV testing may be concluded 4 months after exposure ( Box 2 ); if a newer testing platform is not available, follow-up HIV testing is typically concluded 6 months after an HIV exposure.

The hospital environment is a potential reservoir of bacteria with plasmids conferring carbapenem resistance. Our Hospital Epidemiology Service routinely performs extensive sampling of high-touch surfaces, sinks, and other locations in the hospital. Over a 2-year period, additional sampling was conducted at a broader range of locations, including housekeeping closets, wastewater from hospital internal pipes, and external manholes. We compared these data with previously collected information from 5 years of patient clinical and surveillance isolates. Whole-genome sequencing and analysis of 108 isolates provided comprehensive characterization of bla KPC /bla NDM -positive isolates, enabling an in-depth genetic comparison. Strikingly, despite a very low prevalence of patient infections with bla KPC -positive organisms, all samples from the intensive care unit pipe wastewater and external manholes contained carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPOs), suggesting a vast, resilient reservoir. We observed a diverse set of species and plasmids, and we noted species and susceptibility profile differences between environmental and patient populations of CPOs. However, there were plasmid backbones common to both populations, highlighting a potential environmental reservoir of mobile elements that may contribute to the spread of resistance genes. Clear associations between patient and environmental isolates were uncommon based on sequence analysis and epidemiology, suggesting reasonable infection control compliance at our institution. Nonetheless, a probable nosocomial transmission of Leclercia sp. from the housekeeping environment to a patient was detected by this extensive surveillance. These data and analyses further our understanding of CPOs in the hospital environment and are broadly relevant to the design of infection control strategies in many infrastructure settings.IMPORTANCE Carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPOs) are a global concern because of the morbidity and mortality associated with these resistant Gramnegative bacteria. Horizontal plasmid transfer spreads the resistance mechanism to new bacteria, and understanding the plasmid ecology of the hospital environment can assist in the design of control strategies to prevent nosocomial infections. A 5-year genomic and epidemiological survey was undertaken to study the CPOs in the patient-accessible environment, as well as in the plumbing system removed from the patient. This comprehensive survey revealed a vast, unappreciated reservoir of CPOs in wastewater, which was in contrast to the low positivity rate in both the patient population and the patient-accessible environment. While there were few patient-environmental isolate associations, there were plasmid backbones common to both populations. These results are relevant to all hospitals for which CPO colonization may not yet be defined through extensive surveillance.

Combining our results with those of other prospective studies, the risk for HIV-1 transmission associated with a percutaneous exposure to blood from an HIV-1-infected patient is approximately 0.3% per exposure (95% CI, 0.13% to 0.70%); the risks associated with occupational mucous membrane and cutaneous exposures are likely to be substantially smaller. These data support the use of barrier precautions and suggest a need for strategies that change health care providers' attitudes and behaviors.

This guideline provides the updated recommendations of the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) regarding the management of healthcare providers who are infected with hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and/or the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). For the reasons cited in the guideline, SHEA continues to recommend that, although some aspects of the approach to and administrative management of each of these infectious syndromes in healthcare providers are similar, separate management strategies for healthcare workers who are infected with these unrelated viruses remain appropriate. As we did in both prior iterations of this document, SHEA emphasizes the use of appropriate infection control procedures to minimize exposure of patients or providers to blood, emphasizes that transfers of blood from patients to providers and from providers to patients should be avoided, and recommends that infected healthcare providers should not be totally prohibited from participating in patient-care activities solely on the basis of a bloodborne pathogen infection. The types of procedures assessed by the panel as associated with an increased risk for provider-to-patient transmission of these pathogens are discussed in detail. For each pathogen, recommendations are graduated according to the relative viral load level of the infected provider (Tables 1 and 2). However, SHEA emphasizes that, because of the complexity of these cases, each such case will be slightly different from the next, and each should be independently considered in context.

Introduction Participants’ perceptions of their research experiences provide valuable measures of ethical treatment, yet no validated instruments exist to measure these experiences. We conducted focus groups of research participants and professionals as the initial step in developing a validated instrument. Methods Research participants enrolled in twelve focus groups, consisting of: 1) individuals with disorders undergoing interventions or 2) in natural history studies; or 3) healthy volunteers. Research professionals participated in six separate groups of 1) IRB members, ethicists, Research Subject Advocates, 2) research nurses/coordinators, or 3) investigators. Focus groups used standard methodologies. Results 85 participants and 29 professionals enrolled at 8 academic centers. Altruism and personal relevance of the research were commonly identified motivators; financial compensation was less commonly mentioned. Participants were satisfied with informed consent processes but disappointed if not provided test results, or study outcomes. Positive relationships with research teams were valued highly. Research professionals were concerned about risks, undue influence, and informed consent. Conclusions Participants join studies for varied, complex reasons, notably altruism and personal relevance. They value staff relationships, health gains, new knowledge, and compensation, and expect professionalism and good organization. Based on these insights, we propose specific actions to enhance participant recruitment, retention and satisfaction.