No abstract

Disturbances in the experience of time have been a commonly reported feature of depressive disorders since the beginning of modern psychiatry and psychological research. However, qualitative research approaches to investigate the phenomenon are rarely used. We employed content analysis to investigate disturbances of time experience in Major Depressive Disorder. Our analysis from 25 participants showed that individuals with Major Depressive Disorder subjectively seem to have lost the ability to influence or change the present, resulting in an impersonal and blocked future. The present is rendered meaningless, the past unchangeably negative, and the passage of time turned into a dragging, inexorable, and viscous continuance. The overall,—possibly intersubjective—concept of time experience, remains largely intact, causing or adding to depressive mood and suffering. We elaborate on how these findings reflect previous theories on the experience of time in depression. This study might encourage future inquiries into both the phenomenal and neuroscientific foundation of time experience under psychopathological conditions.

Disturbances in time experience have been argued to play a significant, if not causative role in the clinical presentation of schizophrenia. Phenomenological considerations suggest a fragmented or dis-articulated time experience causing both primary symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, and self-disorders, as well as an intersubjective desynchronization. We employed content analysis on material collected from patients diagnosed with schizophrenia using the Time Questionnaire to generate hypotheses on possible disturbances of time experience in schizophrenia. As a key result we find evidence for the distinction between acute psychotic and post-psychotic syndromes. Acute psychosis is predominantly a disturbance of the passage of time, whereas the remission from psychosis is primarily defined by changes in the experience of the explicit structure of time integrating past, present, and future. We discuss our findings with regards to previous insights and observations on time experience and time perception. We suggest our findings hold significance for the diagnostic and therapeutic understanding of schizophrenia as well as for future integrative research on time experience in general.

Although the experience of time is of central relevance for psychopathology, qualitative approaches to study the inner experience of time have been largely neglected in autism research. We present results from qualitative data acquired from 26 adults with high functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Employing inductive content analysis we identified a distinct pattern of interrupted time experience in ASD. Individuals with ASD seemed to implement structured and routine behavior by future planning to guarantee that the present passed uninterrupted. We reason that the success of corresponding compensatory mechanisms determines the development of distress and noticeable symptoms. Considering recent theories on Bayesian perceptual inference we relate the syndrome of interrupted time experience to the putative neuronal mechanisms underlying time experience.