We examine the relation between the gender diversity on boards of corporations and the levels of information asymmetry in the stock market. Prior evidence suggests that the presence of women on director boards increases the quantity and quality of public disclosure by firms, and we therefore expect firms with higher gender diversity on their boards to show lower levels of information asymmetry in the market. Using a Spanish sample, proxies for information asymmetry estimated from high-frequency data along with system GMM panel methodology, we find that the gender diversity on boards is negatively associated with the level of information asymmetry in the stock market. Our findings support the changes in the laws that have been introduced in several countries to increase the proportion of female company directors by providing evidence that gender diverse boards have beneficial effects on stock markets.

The purpose of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), adopted mandatorily by European listed firms in 2005, is to increase the transparency and the comparability of accounting information, which should have led to improvements in these firms' information environment. This study uses market microstructure proxies for information asymmetry to examine the effects of IFRS adoption on the level of information asymmetry in the Spanish stock market. Therefore, we consider a setting with substantial differences between local standards-Spanish Accounting Standards (SAS)-and IFRS and where the level of enforcement is low. By controlling for conventional determinants of information asymmetry and firms' characteristics that influence their information environment, we find a reduction of information asymmetry after IFRS adoption. Our findings suggest that the mandatory switch from local accounting standards to IFRS conveys benefits to the market, even when the enforcement level is not strong.

The literature suggests that real earnings management (REM) activities can increase adverse selection-risk in capital markets. Due to their opacity and the difficulties in understanding their implications, REM strategies may increase the level of information asymmetry among investors. This paper examines the association between earnings management through real activities manipulation and information asymmetry in the equity market. To estimate the level of adverse selection risk we use a comprehensive index of information asymmetry measures proposed by the market microstructure literature. For a sample of Spanish listed firms, we find that firms' strategies of increasing earnings through REM are associated with higher information asymmetry in those firms that meet last year's earnings. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings management through real activities manipulation garbles the market, enhances private information production, and exacerbates information asymmetry in the stock market.

"The 'magnet' or 'gravitational' effect hypothesis asserts that, when trading halts are rule-based, investors concerned with a likely impediment to trade advance trades in time. This behaviour actually pushes prices further towards the limit. Empirical studies about the magnet effect are scarce, most likely because of the unavailability of data on rule-based halts. In this paper, we use a large database from the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE), which combines intraday stock specific price limits and short-lived rule-based call auctions to stabilise prices, to test this hypothesis. The SSE is particularly well suited to test the magnet effect hypothesis since trading halts are price-triggered and, therefore, predictable to some extent. Still, the SSE microstructure presents two particularities: (i) a limit-hit triggers an automatic switch to an alternative trading mechanism, a call auction, rather than a pure halt; (ii) the trading halt only lasts 5 minutes. We find that, even when prices are within a very short distance to the price limits, the probability of observing a limit-hit is unexpectedly low. Additionally, prices either initiate reversion (non limit-hit days) or slow down gradually (limit-hit days) as they come near the intraday limits. Finally, the most aggressive traders progressively become more patient as prices approach the limits. Therefore, both the price patterns and the trading behaviour reported near the limits do not agree with the price limits acting as magnetic fields. Consequently, we conclude that the switching mechanism implemented in the SSE does not induce traders to advance their trading programs in time." Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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