Abstract. A number of scholars have noted a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital or social trust, especially in the US. Evidence from other countries has been more mixed and sometimes contradictory. In this paper we provide the first Anglo-American comparative analysis of the relationship between neighbourhood diversity and social capital, and show how this relationship varies across ethnic categories. We apply multilevel structural equation models to individual level data from the 2000 Citizen Benchmark Survey for the US and the 2005 Citizenship Survey for Great Britain. The findings suggest that while for attitudinal social capital among Whites the negative underlying relationship with diversity is apparent in both countries, the effect is much weaker or reversed for minority groups. For structural social capital the negative relationship is apparent for minorities but not Whites, but this is mainly attributable to other neighbourhood characteristics.Résumé. Un certain nombre d'universitaires ont noté une relation négative entre la diversité ethnique et le capital social ou la confiance sociale, surtout aux États-Unis. D'autres pays, par contre, offrent des constats plus mitigés et parfois contradictoires. Dans cet article, nous présentons la première analyse comparative anglo-américaine de la relation entre la diversité du voisinage et le capital social et nous démontrons comment cette relation varie selon les catégories ethniques. Nous appliquons des modélisations par équation structurelle à multiniveaux à des données de niveau individuel provenant du Citizen Benchmark Survey de 2000 pour les États-Unis et du Citizenship Survey de 2005 pour la Grande-Bretagne. Les résultats démontrent que si, pour le capital social attitudinal, la relation fondamentale négative avec la diversité est évidente parmi les Blancs dans les deux pays, l'effet est cependant beaucoup plus faible ou renversé pour les groupes minoritaires. En ce qui concerne le capital social structurel, la relation négative est évidente pour les minorités, mais pas pour les Blancs, mais cette situation est principalement attribuable à d'autres caractéristiques du voisinage.

While Euroscepticism is the most important driver of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) support, other attitudinal drivers – namely dissatisfaction towards mainstream parties and xenophobia – are also important. Examining vote‐switching between first‐ and second‐order elections evidence is found of a distinction between two types of supporter: more affluent and middle‐class ‘strategic defectors’ from the mainstream Conservative Party who support UKIP to register their Euroscepticism, and more economically marginal and politically disaffected ‘core loyalists’ who are attracted to UKIP by its anti‐immigration rhetoric and populist anti‐establishment strategy. UKIP also succeeds in attracting core support from groups such as women who have traditionally rejected extreme right parties such as the British National Party (BNP). This suggests that UKIP is well positioned to recruit a broader and more enduring base of support than the BNP.

Superstitions were demonstrated with human subjects when presses on one button were reinforced on a VI 30-sec schedule while presses on a second were never reinforced. Superstitious responding, on the second button, was often maintained because presses on that button were frequently followed by reinforcement for a subsequent press on the first button. The introduction of a changeover delay (COD), which separated in time presses on the second button and subsequent reinforced presses on the first button, reduced or eliminated the superstitious responding of these subjects. Some complex superstitions were also demonstrated with other subjects for which the COD was in effect from the beginning of the session.Superstitious responding, or responding that is maintained through accidental correlation with reinforcement (Skinner, 1948)

This paper establishes a model of likely campaign effectiveness, before examining the intensity of constituency campaigning at the 2010 General Election in Britain and its subsequent impact on electoral outcomes, using both aggregate and individual level data. It shows that constituency campaigning yielded benefits in varying degrees for all three main parties and that Labour's constituency campaign efforts were effective despite the electoral context, and ultimately affected the overall outcome of the election. These findings have significant implications for our understanding of the circumstances under which campaigns are likely to be more or less effective, and provide further evidence that a carefully managed campaign stands the most chance of delivering tangible electoral payoffs.Keywords: Campaigning; Political Parties; 2010 General Election; Britain; Campaign Management; Electoral Impact Introduction -The growing importance and potential for campaign effectsIn studies of the past few elections, a broad consensus has developed to suggest that election campaigning may be electorally effective in Britain (Clarke et al, 2004(Clarke et al, , 2009Whiteley & Seyd, 1994;Pattie, et al., 1995;Denver et al., 2003). Indeed, there are several contextual effects that heighten the potential for campaign payoffs. First, the strength of partisan identification in Britain has declined in intensity, and to a lesser extent in overall volume though the core of fairly strong partisans has remained relatively constant (see Figure 1). Secondly, voter hesitancy has increased (see Figure 2). In 2010, fully 37% of respondents to the British Election Study post-election survey indicated that they had made their decision on how to vote during the campaign, with a further 13% indicating that their decision had been taken since the turn of the year. Given that all parties engage in 'longterm' campaigning -especially in target seats (Fisher & Denver, 2008) -there would appear to be significant potential at least for constituency campaigning to be electorally significant. 1.1In this paper we seek to measure the electoral impact of the three main British parties' campaigns at the 2010 election (Conservative, Labour and the Liberal Democrats).Aggregate data are drawn from a survey of all electoral agents of the five major parties in Great Britain -the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party (N=1,993). 2 1,079 valid responses were received -an overall response rate of 54%. Details of responses by party are shown in the Appendix. These illustrate a representative spread of constituencies. In order to confirm this, however, means were compared in respect of candidate spending (percentage of maximum spent) during the regulated long and short campaigns. For all parties, the results indicate that our sample is robust (see Appendix). In addition, in depth interviews were conducted with the parties at national level, as well as with agents in constituencies selected on the basis of their elec...

The elections to the European Parliament (EP) held in June 2009 marked a breakthrough for the extreme right British National Party (BNP), while in other European states extreme right parties (ERPs) similarly made gains. However, the attitudinal drivers of support for the BNP and ERPs more generally remain under‐researched. This article draws on unique data that allow unprecedented insight into the attitudinal profile of ERP voters in Britain – an often neglected case in the wider literature. A series of possible motivational drivers of extreme right support are separated out: racial prejudice, anti‐immigrant sentiment, protest against political elites, Euroscepticism, homophobia and Islamophobia. It is found that BNP support in the 2009 EP elections was motivationally diverse, with racist hostility, xenophobia and protest voting all contributing significantly to BNP voting. The analysis suggests that the BNP, which has long been a party stigmatised by associations with racism and violent extremism, made a key breakthrough in 2009. While racist motivations remain the strongest driver of support for the party, it has also begun to win over a broader coalition of anti‐immigrant and anti‐elite voters.

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There has been for some time a significant and growing body of research around the relationship between sport and social capital. Similarly within sociology there has been a corpus of work that has acknowledged the emergence of the omnivore-univore relationship. Surprisingly relatively few studies examining sport and social capital have taken the omnivore -univore framework as a basis for understanding the relationship between sport and social capital. This gap in the sociology of sport literature and knowledge is rectified by this study that takes not Putnam, Coleman or Bourdieu but Lin's social network approach to social capital. The implications of this article are that researchers investigating sport and social capital need to understand more about how social networks and places for sport work to create social capital and in particular the changing dynamics of social class. The results indicate that social networks both facilitate and constrain sports participation, whilst family and friendship networks are central in active lifestyles, those less active have limited networks. Key wordsSocial capital has been conceptualised and operationalized in a number of ways (Bourdieu, 1984; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000; Nan Lin, 2001). There are many reasons why social capital has attracted so much attention over the past thirty years or so: the assumption that civil society and democracy depend upon it; that some of the important features that contribute to social life such as networks, norms and trust have been diminishing; that civic engagement, volunteering, and community networks, public service have all been under threat and that the means or the resources for developing shared human objectives and capabilities have been challenged as a result of changing individual and societal priorities.As scholarly interest in the concept of social capital has flourished, the relationship between sport and social capital has gained greater prominence, primarily through the seminal contributions of Jarvie (2003), Delaney and Keaney (2005), Coalter (2007), Nicholson and Hoye (2008), and more recently, Widdop and Cutts (2012a) and Nichols, Tacon and Muir (2013). This body of work has at its core some or all of the following themes: the extent to which sport contributes to the bridging and/or bonding aspects of social capital; the relationship between sports participation and social capital; the role of sport in fostering different aspects of communitarianism; and the role of sport in the development of not just human capabilities but community life as suggested by a former UN Secretary General for Europe who asserted that "The hidden face of sport is also the tens of thousands of enthusiasts who find in their football, rowing, athletics and rock climbing clubs a place for meeting and exchange but above all the training ground for community life" (Jarvie and Thornton, 2012: 255).Yet, despite the saliency of sport in the scholarly work of Bourdieu (1984) and calls by cultural sociologist Richard Peterson (2005) to examin...

Using a latent class analysis, we identify distinct typologies of sports' consumers in England and then determine whether the socio-economic makeup of the latent classes resemble recent scholarly work across different cultural and leisure fields. The third part of the analysis provides a nuanced rigorous statistical evaluation of the subtle socio-economic differences between the active sports' clusters. Our analysis is unique with few studies, if any, identifying and then examining types of sports consumers in this way. The findings largely corroborate research in other cultural and leisure fields, although there are distinctive types of consumers' specific to sport along gender lines, and a group which consumes highbrow sports but when compared to other types of sports' consumers, do not exclusively come from the higher social strata.