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Objective In this article, we evaluate and compare the frailties of two different standards of disclosure of information regarding the risks of medical procedures applied in recent judicial decisions in the United Kingdom. As an alternative, we present the tenets and philosophical grounds of an agency model of consent and a person‐based standard of disclosure. Methods Critical philosophical analysis of the background assumptions of two standards of disclosure and their relative “tests of negligence” applied in recent legal judgements in the United Kingdom. Results Both standards, the “Professional Practice Standard” (the traditional standard employed in Sidaway versus Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital, 1985) and the allegedly new “Reasonable Person Standard” (mentioned in Montgomery versus Lanarkshire Health Board, 2015), can lead to malpractice if the medical‐patient relationship is not guided by attitudes of respectful care. The traditional standard is disrespectful as it does not take patients as full agents, presupposing that the patient's right is only a negative right to refuse what was deliberated only by the practitioner. The “new” standard can be disrespectful if the practitioner, concerned only with what a hypothetical reasonable individual would take as relevant for choosing between alternatives of treatment, does not know how to respect their real patient in a genuine shared decision‐making process. Conclusion We conclude that in order to know how to obtain valid informed consent, doctors need to engage in real conversations with their patients, revealing as much information as they, taken as real persons, need to be part of a genuine shared and respectful decision‐making process.

This paper advances a new moral epistemology and explores some of its normative and practical, especially bioethical, implications. In the first part, it shows that there is moral knowledge and that it is best understood in terms of knowing-how. Thus, moral knowledge cannot be analysed purely in the traditional terms of knowing-that. The fundamental idea is that one knows-how to act morally only if she is capable of following the right normative standards. In the second part, the paper discusses ways of integrating two expressions of moral knowing-how, namely caring and respecting into a coherent normative theory. It builds up the concept of respectful care as the central ingredient of such a normative theory. Finally, it illustrates how respectful care may transform some of our current clinical bioethical practices.

O presente artigo apresenta os principais componentes da filosofia política de Dworkin, aqui chamada de "igualitarismo liberal." Para atingir esse objetivo, reconstrói a sua teoria do Direito e sua compreensão do direito fundamental de todos cidadãos ao igual respeito e consideração. Além disso, discute criticamente a sua tentativa de compatibilizar essa igualdade formal, bem como uma concepção mais substancial de igualdade, com a liberdade.
This paper sorts out the main elements in Dworkin's political philosophy here called "liberal igualitarianism." To reach this aim, it reconstructs his conception of Law and his understanding of the citizens' most fundamental right to equal respect and concern. Moreover, it analyzes his attempt to reconcile this formal equality, as well as a more substantial equality, with freedo

ABSTRACT. This paper aims at discussing the different applications of the method of justification known as 'reflective equilibrium" to bioethical problems. In the first part, it reconstructs its description made by John Rawls in "A Theory of Justice," his further distinction between "Narrow" and "Wide" Reflective Equilibrium and his own applications to eugenics and abortion. In the second part, it discusses the extension made by Norman Daniels of Rawls' theory of justice, his applications of the referred method and his contributions to bioethics, especially for the construction of a fair health care system. In the third part, it deals with the adoption of the method made by Beauchamp and Childress. In the conclusion, some criticism addressed to the method of the reflective equilibrium and its applications to bioethics are assessed.

This paper tries to rethink the notion of human rights and to evaluate whether we should redefine them in light of the main challenges presented by advances in technoscience (genetic engineering, robotics, nanotechnology etc.). It claims that there are basic, intrinsic rights to personhood, which, on the one hand, allow us to justify a moral claim to a posthuman existence (should it become possible) and to attribute rights to artificial agents, while, on the other hand, granting the moral entitlement to remain human. This shows that the notion of human rights is far from becoming obsolete, as claimed by some scholars. The paper is divided into five parts. It (1) presents reasons for rethinking the notion of "a right" in order to apply it to beings other than humans (e.g., nonhuman animals, robots etc.); (2) discusses the metaethical problem concerning the meaning of "a right"; (3) presents a basic system of rights that are intrinsic to personhood and that can be attributed to different kinds of agents (human or not); (4) analyzes whether there is a right to a posthuman existence or a right to remain human; and finally, (5) presents some reasons to justify such a system of rights.

RESUMOO trabalho apresenta uma análise conceitual do termo 'cuidado'. O ponto de partida da discussão é a proposta de Noddings feita no livro Caring. O presente artigo apresenta uma série de problemas da aná-lise de Noddings (circularidade etc.) e defende uma análise alternativa. Mostra-se também que, de fato, há vários tipos de cuidado (maternal, médico etc.) e subtipos (no cuidado médico, há cuidados básicos, cuidados paliativos etc.). Finalmente, o trabalho discute algumas implicações éticas do 'cuidado' a partir da análise proposta, por exemplo, se ele gera razões para agir que são relativas-ao-agente ou neutras. Palavras-chave: analise, cuidado, razões para agir. ABSTRACTThe main aim of the paper is to present a conceptual analysis of 'care'. The starting point is Noddings's proposal made in her book Caring. I point out that her analysis has many problems (e.g., it is circular) and I present an alternative model. I show that there are in fact many kinds of caring relationships (maternal, medical etc) and subtypes (in the medical domain, primary care, palliative care etc) and that my model describes moral care. Finally, I discuss some of the ethical implications of my analysis of 'care', for instance, whether it generates reasons for action which are neutral or agent-relative.

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