Given the broad capabilities of large language models, it should be possible to work towards a general-purpose, text-based assistant that is aligned with human values, meaning that it is helpful, honest, and harmless. As an initial foray in this direction we study simple baseline techniques and evaluations, such as prompting. We find that the benefits from modest interventions increase with model size, generalize to a variety of alignment evaluations, and do not compromise the performance of large models. Next we investigate scaling trends for several training objectives relevant to alignment, comparing imitation learning, binary discrimination, and ranked preference modeling. We find that ranked preference modeling performs much better than imitation learning, and often scales more favorably with model size. In contrast, binary discrimination typically performs and scales very similarly to imitation learning. Finally we study a 'preference model pre-training' stage of training, with the goal of improving sample efficiency when finetuning on human preferences.

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Recent large language models have been trained on vast datasets, but also often on repeated data, either intentionally for the purpose of upweighting higher quality data, or unintentionally because data deduplication is not perfect and the model is exposed to repeated data at the sentence, paragraph, or document level. Some works have reported substantial negative performance effects of this repeated data. In this paper we attempt to study repeated data systematically and to understand its effects mechanistically. To do this, we train a family of models where most of the data is unique but a small fraction of it is repeated many times. We find a strong double descent phenomenon, in which repeated data can lead test loss to increase midway through training. A predictable range of repetition frequency leads to surprisingly severe degradation in performance. For instance, performance of an 800M parameter model can be degraded to that of a 2x smaller model (400M params) by repeating 0.1% of the data 100 times, despite the other 90% of the training tokens remaining unique. We suspect there is a range in the middle where the data can be memorized and doing so consumes a large fraction of the model's capacity, and this may be where the peak of degradation occurs. Finally, we connect these observations to recent mechanistic interpretability work -attempting to reverse engineer the detailed computations performed by the model -by showing that data repetition disproportionately damages copying and internal structures associated with generalization, such as induction heads, providing a possible mechanism for the shift from generalization to memorization. Taken together, these results provide a hypothesis for why repeating a relatively small fraction of data in large language models could lead to disproportionately large harms to performance.

Large-scale pre-training has recently emerged as a technique for creating capable, generalpurpose, generative models such as GPT-3, Megatron-Turing NLG, Gopher, and many others. In this paper, we highlight a counterintuitive property of such models and discuss the policy implications of this property. Namely, these generative models have an unusual combination of predictable loss on a broad training distribution (as embodied in their "scaling laws"), and unpredictable specific capabilities, inputs, and outputs. We believe that the high-level predictability and appearance of useful capabilities drives rapid development of such models, while the unpredictable qualities make it difficult to anticipate the consequences of model deployment. We go through examples of how this combination can lead to socially harmful behavior with examples from the literature and real world observations, and we also perform two novel experiments to illustrate our point about harms from unpredictability. Furthermore, we analyze how these conflicting properties combine to give model developers various motivations for deploying these models, and challenges that can hinder deployment. We conclude with a list of possible interventions the AI community may take to increase the chance of these models having a beneficial impact. We intend this paper to be useful to policymakers who want to understand and regulate AI systems, technologists who care about the potential policy impact of their work, and academics who want to analyze, critique, and potentially develop large generative models.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct"-to avoid producing harmful outputs-if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.