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Scholars have long studied how social movements frame and deliver their messages, yet less is known about how these “signals” are received by the public. In this study, we examine how a social movement participant’s characteristics interact with a bystander’s to influence movement support. In addition, we examine how perceived likelihood of violence mediates these outcomes. We propose five competing models based on previous theories of emotion, race, and political views in social movement support. To adjudicate between these frameworks, we conduct an experiment using a 2x2 factorial design in which participants read a news story about a protest accompanied by an image of a neutral/angry, white/Black protestor, measuring three types of social movement support, and examine results and model fit. Results provide support for a politicized-race model: a Black protestor is more motivating for liberals’ social movement support, while a white protestor is more motivating for conservatives. Both liberals and conservatives are more likely to associate the protest with violence after seeing a Black protestor compared to a white one. Racialized perceptions of violence explain part of conservatives’ hesitancy to support the movement when seeing a Black protestor and inhibits part of the otherwise-positive effect of seeing a Black protestor for liberals.

Ethno-racial differences in poverty are substantial and persistent in the US. To explain these differences, scholars have relied largely on behavioral explanations, which argue that poverty is the result of high prevalences of problematic behaviors or “risks.” Given substantial differences in the prevalence of risks, scholars intuit that ethno-racial differences in poverty are explained by disproportionately high prevalences of risks in Black and Latino populations. However, these approaches rely heavily on untested assumptions regarding the relationship between risks and poverty rates. Using the 1993-2016 Current Population Survey and the Urban Institute’s TRIM3 model to derive high-quality estimates of income and poverty, I confirm persistent and substantial ethno-racial differences in poverty. Next, I employ a prevalences and penalties framework to compare risks in Black, Latino, and white-lead households. This framework is then leveraged to estimate counterfactual models to predict Black and Latino poverty rates given alternative prevalences of risks. The findings demonstrate that if the prevalence of risks for Black and Latino Americans was equal that of whites, poverty rates would remain over twice as high for Black and Latino individuals compared to whites. Furthermore, even when risks are eliminated for Black and Latino Americans, poverty remains substantially higher compared to whites. These findings undermine behavioral approaches to understanding poverty and point to the need for scholars to pursue alternatives, including structural and political explanations.

Scholars have long studied how social movements frame and deliver their messages, yet much less is known about how these “signals” are received by the public. In this study, we ask whether and how social movement members’ characteristics interact with a bystander’s to influence whether they support a particular protest movement. In addition, we examine how perceived likelihood of violence mediates these outcomes. We test five competing models based on previous theories of emotion, race, and political views in social movement support. To adjudicate between these frameworks, we conduct an experiment using a 2x2 factorial design in which participants read a news story about a protest accompanied by an image of a neutral/angry, white/Black protestor, measuring three types of social movement support. Results provide support for the politicized race model: a Black protestor is more motivating for liberals’ social movement support, while a white protestor is more motivating for conservatives. Both liberals and conservatives are more likely to associate the protest with violence after seeing a Black protestor compared to a white one. Racialized perceptions of violence explain part of conservatives’ hesitancy to support the movement when seeing a Black protestor and inhibits part of the otherwise-positive effect of seeing a Black protestor for liberals.

Conflict between groups plays a powerful role in shaping social interaction within groups. Within groups, social status—respect, prestige, and deference—organizes, motivates, and stratifies social interaction. Yet, studies exploring how conflict between groups shapes social status within groups are relatively rare. We argue that intergroup conflict creates opportunities for individuals to gain or lose status by demonstrating group commitment. We examine two contrasting intergroup behaviors—revenge and forgiveness—and evaluate the idea that these behaviors will be viewed as status-worthy to the extent that they are perceived to signal group motivation. Furthermore, we test the hypothesis that avengers and forgivers gain status by offering group-motivated accounts of their behavior. Pairing an original national probability sample with an experimental survey design, we examine how avengers and forgivers are viewed in everyday conflicts across three widely held identities: national identity, political partisanship, and sports team fandom. We find that Americans perceive intergroup forgiveness as more status-worthy, and a stronger indicator of group motivation, than intergroup revenge. In open-ended survey questions, forgiving ingroup members were described as more status-worthy, competent, and warm, and less dominant than their vengeful counterparts. However, we find little evidence that individuals can directly gain status by claiming that their actions are motivated by concern for the group. Our work speaks to theories of conflict, identity, and social status. More broadly, understanding how Americans value intergroup revenge and forgiveness offers insight into the frequency and intensity of identity-based conflict in contemporary American society.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the current literature which assesses the incidence of completed or attempted mass shooting events in which a female party acted either alone or as an accomplice; explore the involvement of women in the planning or execution of acts of terrorism; evaluate the pathology of women involved in these acts of extreme violence; highlight any gender-specific pathological and environmental risk factors associated with the planning or completion of the mass shooting, spree killing or terrorist attack events. Design/methodology/approach Using the 27-item preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses guidelines (Moher et al., 2009), the present systematic review explored peer-reviewed literature published between 1908 and September 2020 using six databases [SalfordUniversityJournals@Ovid; Journals@Ovid Full Text; APA PsycArticles Full Text; APA PsycExtra; APA PsycInfo; Ovid MEDLINE(R)], in addition to conducting a grey literature search on “Google Scholar” using specific search terms, predetermined following use of the patient/population, intervention, comparison framework. Findings Findings of the review did identify several distinguishing characteristics exclusive to women allied to terror organisations; including lower levels of extremism and religious ideology, lower age of radicalisation, higher levels of education than currently hypothesized and the significance of relational affiliation with extremist causes. Despite the synthesis of descriptive characterises being achieved, data relating to female mass shooters was scant and relied upon case study review and discussion. As a result, identification of precipitating psychopathological and environmental triggers was difficult, however, there does appear to be a higher proportion of female mass shooters targeting current or previous places of employment. Research limitations/implications One of the potential limitations of this review is that some relevant studies were not identified during the search. The risk of this was minimised as much as possible by screening the reference section of relevant reviews and theoretical papers (which were identified in the search of the databases) for any potentially relevant studies that may have been missed. In addition, numerous permutations of the search criteria that were entered into the databases were also entered into “GoogleScholar”. Practical implications Current literature has highlighted that the age of radicalisation among women across both jihadi-inspired, right-wing and far-left extremist organisations are decreasing, with many new recruits being born after 1990 (Jacques and Taylor, 2012). This finding aids in identifying a target of entry to minimise the chance of radicalisation, through targeted educational training and anti-radicalisation programmes intervening in at risk groups at the correct time. However, further exploration will be necessary to identify specific risk factors prior to radicalisation in such groups. Originality/value There appears to be a large gap in literature quantitively assessing the rates of psychopathological variables among this demographic. When narrowing the lens further onto female mass shooters, empirical literature investigating even characteristic variables continues to evade the academic remit. Arguably this obstruction to the current understanding of female perpetrated violence, both in an organised terror and a mass shooter capacity, limits the ability to meaningfully evaluate whether previous models assessing risk among mass shooters is valid across genders.

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