A significant body of research in cognitive neuroscience is aimed at understanding how object concepts are represented in the human brain. However, it remains unknown whether and where the visual and abstract conceptual features that define an object concept are integrated. We addressed this issue by comparing the neural pattern similarities among object-evoked fMRI responses with behavior-based models that independently captured the visual and conceptual similarities among these stimuli. Our results revealed evidence for distinctive coding of visual features in lateral occipital cortex, and conceptual features in the temporal pole and parahippocampal cortex. By contrast, we found evidence for integrative coding of visual and conceptual object features in perirhinal cortex. The neuroanatomical specificity of this effect was highlighted by results from a searchlight analysis. Taken together, our findings suggest that perirhinal cortex uniquely supports the representation of fully specified object concepts through the integration of their visual and conceptual features.

Despite the importance of breaches of taste identity expectation for survival, its neural correlate is unknown. We used fMRI in 16 women to examine brain response to expected and unexpected receipt of sweet taste and tasteless/odorless solutions. During expected trials (70%) subjects heard “sweet” or “tasteless” and received the liquid indicated by the cue. During unexpected trials (30%) subjects heard “sweet” but received tasteless or they heard “tasteless” but received sweet. Following delivery, subjects indicated stimulus identity by pressing a button. Reaction time was faster and more accurate following valid cuing, indicating that the cues altered expectancy as intended. Tasting unexpected vs. expected stimuli resulted in greater deactivation in fusiform gyri, possibly reflecting greater suppression of visual object regions when orienting to, and identifying, an unexpected taste. Significantly greater activation to unexpected vs. expected stimuli occurred in areas related to taste (thalamus, anterior insula), reward (VS, OFC), and attention (anterior cingulate cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, IPS). We also observed an interaction between stimulus and expectation in the anterior insula primary taste cortex. Here response was greater for unexpected vs. expected sweet compared to unexpected vs. expected tasteless, indicating that this region is preferentially sensitive to breaches of taste expectation. Connectivity analyses confirmed that expectation enhanced network interactions, with IPS and VS influencing insular responses. We conclude that unexpected oral stimulation results in suppression of visual cortex and up-regulation of sensory, attention, and reward regions to support orientation, identification and learning about salient stimuli.

Skin conductance responses (SCR) measure objective arousal in response to emotionally-relevant stimuli. Central nervous system influence on SCR is exerted differentially by the two hemispheres. Differences between SCR recordings from the left and right hands may therefore be expected. This study focused on emotionally expressive faces, known to be processed differently by the two hemispheres. Faces depicting neutral, happy, sad, angry, fearful or disgusted expressions were presented in two tasks, one with an explicit emotion judgment and the other with an age judgment. We found stronger responses to sad and happy faces compared with neutral from the left hand during the implicit task, and stronger responses to negative emotions compared with neutral from the right hand during the explicit task. Our results suggest that basic social stimuli generate distinct responses on the two hands, no doubt related to the lateralization of social function in the brain.

Surprisingly little is known about how the brain combines spatial elements to form a coherent percept. Regions that may underlie this process include the hippocampus (HC) and parahippocampal place area (PPA), regions central to spatial perception but whose role in spatial coherency has not been explored. Participants were scanned with functional MRI while they judged whether Escher-like scenes were possible or impossible. Univariate analyses revealed differential HC and PPA involvement, with greater HC activity during spatial incoherency detection and more PPA activity during spatial coherency detection. Recognition and eye-tracking data ruled out long- or short-term memory confounds. Multivariate statistics demonstrated spatial coherency-dependent functional connectivity for the HC, but not PPA, with greater HC connectivity to various brain regions including lateral occipital complex during spatial incoherency detection. We suggest the PPA is preferentially involved during the perception of spatially coherent scenes, whereas the HC binds distinct features to create coherent representations. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

A tremendous body of research in cognitive neuroscience is aimed at understanding how object concepts are represented in the human brain. However, it remains unknown whether and where the visual and abstract conceptual features that define an object concept are integrated. We addressed this issue by comparing the neural pattern similarities among object-evoked fMRI responses with behavior-based models that independently captured the visual and conceptual similarities among these stimuli. Our results revealed evidence for distinctive coding of visual features in lateral occipital cortex, and conceptual features in the temporal pole and parahippocampal cortex. By contrast, we found evidence for integrative coding of visual and conceptual object features in perirhinal cortex. The neuroanatomical specificity of this effect was highlighted by results from a searchlight analysis. Taken together, our findings suggest that perirhinal cortex uniquely supports the representation of fully-specified object concepts through the integration of their visual and conceptual features.

The insula plays an important role both in emotion processing and in the generation of epileptic seizures. In the current study we examined thickness of insular cortices and bilateral skin conductance responses (SCR) in healthy subjects in addition to a small number of patients with temporal lobe epilepsy. SCR measures arousal and is used to assess non-conscious responses to emotional stimuli. We used two emotion tasks, one explicitly about emotion and the other implicit. The explicit task required judgments about emotions being expressed in photographs of faces, while the implicit one required judgments about the age of the people in the photographs. Patients and healthy differed in labeling neutral faces, but not other emotions. They also differed in their SCR to emotions, though the profile depended on which hand the recordings were from. Finally, we found relationships between the thickness of the insula and SCR to each task: in the healthy group the thickness of the left insula was related to SCR to the emotion-labeling task; in the patient group it was between the thickness of the right insula and SCR in the age-labeling task. These patterns were evident only for the right hand recordings, thus underscoring the importance of bilateral recordings.

The ability to flexibly categorize object concepts is essential to semantic cognition because the features that make 2 objects similar in 1 context may be irrelevant and even constitute interference in another. Thus, adaptive behavior in complex and dynamic environments requires the resolution of feature-based interference. In the current case study, we placed visual and functional semantic features in opposition across object concepts in 2 categorization tasks. Successful performance required the resolution of functional interference in a visual categorization task and the resolution of visual interference in a functional categorization task. In Experiment 1, we found that patient D. A., an individual with bilateral temporal lobe lesions, was unable to categorize object concepts in a context-dependent manner. His impairment was characterized by an increased tendency to incorrectly group objects that were similar on the task-irrelevant dimension, revealing an inability to resolve cross-modal semantic interference. In Experiment 2, D. A.'s categorization accuracy was comparable to controls when lures were removed, indicating that his impairment is unique to contexts that involve cross-modal interference. In Experiment 3, he again performed as well as controls when categorizing simple concepts, suggesting that his impairment is specific to categorization of complex object concepts. These results advance our understanding of the anterior temporal lobe as a system that represents object concepts in a manner that enables flexible semantic cognition. Specifically, they reveal a dissociation between semantic representations that contribute to the resolution of cross-modal interference and those that contribute to the resolution of interference within a given modality.

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