Device attestation is an essential feature in many security protocols and applications. The lack of dedicated hardware and the impossibility to physically access devices to be attested, makes attestation of embedded devices, in applications such as Wireless Sensor Networks, a prominent challenge. Several software-based attestation techniques have been proposed that either rely on tight time constraints or on the lack of free space to store malicious code. This paper investigates the shortcomings of existing software-based attestation techniques. We first present two generic attacks, one based on a return-oriented rootkit and the other on code compression. We further describe specific attacks on two existing proposals, namely SWATT and ICE-based schemes, and argue about the difficulty of fixing them. All attacks presented in this paper were implemented and validated on commodity sensors.
International audienceSuppose you find the same username on different online services, what is the probability that these usernames refer to the same physical person? This work addresses what appears to be a fairly simple question, which has many implications for anonymity and privacy on the Internet. One possible way of estimating this probability would be to look at the public information associated to the two accounts and try to match them. However, for most services, these information are chosen by the users themselves and are often very heterogeneous, possibly false and difficult to collect. Furthermore, several websites do not disclose any additional public information about users apart from their usernames (e.g., discus- sion forums or Blog comments), nonetheless, they might contain sensitive information about users. This paper explores the possibility of linking users profiles only by looking at their usernames. The intuition is that the probability that two usernames refer to the same physical person strongly depends on the "entropy" of the username string itself. Our experiments, based on crawls of real web services, show that a significant portion of the users' profiles can be linked using their usernames. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that usernames are considered as a source of information when profiling users on the Internet
Abstract. Remote attestation is the process of verifying internal state of a remote embedded device. It is an important component of many security protocols and applications. Although previously proposed remote attestation techniques assisted by specialized secure hardware are effective, they not yet viable for low-cost embedded devices. One notable alternative is software-based attestation, that is both less costly and more efficient. However, recent results identified weaknesses in some proposed software-based methods, thus showing that security of remote software attestation remains a challenge. Inspired by these developments, this paper explores an approach that relies neither on secure hardware nor on tight timing constraints typical of software-based technqiques. By taking advantage of the bounded memory/storage model of low-cost embedded devices and assuming a small amount of read-only memory (ROM), our approach involves a new primitive -Proofs of Secure Erasure (PoSE-s). We also show that, even though it is effective and provably secure, PoSE-based attestation is not cheap. However, it is particularly well-suited and practical for two other related tasks: secure code update and secure memory/storage erasure. We consider several flavors of PoSE-based protocols and demonstrate their feasibility in the context of existing commodity embedded devices.
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