The paper argues for new concepts in theological ethics: structures of virtue and structures of vice. The Catholic tradition's development of the ‘structures of sin’ in the 1970's and 80's was a significant contribution to magisterial teaching. However, this concept should be updated in light of the trajectory and concepts of post‐Vatican II theological ethics. The article proceeds in two parts. Part one recapitulates the development of the concept of structures of sin in the Catholic tradition from the Second Vatican Council to Pope Benedict XVI's recent social encyclical, Caritas in veritate. Part two reflects on the findings of part one, and proceeds to define and defend the concepts structure of virtue and structures of vice. These related concepts more accurately capture the moral nature of social structures. Social structures have the capacity to produce just or unjust outcomes, and to play a significant role in the character formation of persons. Therefore, the structures of virtue and structures of vice are offered as insightful ways of discussing the moral status of social structures.
The Prologue to the Secunda secundae provides important insight into Aquinas's ethical vision. Therein he lists the essential categories within moral theology. The list includes virtue, vice, gifts, and precepts. Of these four, precepts receive the thinnest treatment. Taking the example of the precept forbidding adultery, he notes that to treat this precept adequately he would need to 'inquire about adultery which is a sin. The knowledge about which depends on his knowledge of the opposite virtue'. 1 This is inefficient, so instead of treating each concept (virtue, vice, gifts and precepts) in isolation, he proposes to treat them using a 'shorter and quicker method'. This shorter method begins with each virtue, and under the aegis of virtue, includes a treatment of its corresponding vices, together with the gifts related to the virtue, and finally the affirmative and negative precepts of the virtue. There are two important insights to glean from this passage. First, precepts are an essential, if overlooked, aspect of Thomas's ethics. Second, precepts are to be understood in relationship to virtues.The purpose of this paper is to investigate how secondary moral precepts, or moral norms, relate to acquired virtues. Three questions drive this study. First, what is the purpose of moral norms in the Summa theologiae? Second, how are moral norms generated in the Summa? Finally, how are moral norms applied in the Summa?A note on language is in order before we begin. There is no single term in Thomas's lexicon that can be readily translated into the contemporary concept of 'moral norm'; the concept of 'secondary moral precept' (secunda praecepta) is the closest in meaning. When referencing Thomas's text, therefore, this paper will employ his language of secondary moral precept, but in commenting on Thomas's ideas and in the conclusions, the language of moral norm will be employed to connect Aquinas's thought to contemporary discussions of the function of moral norms in theological ethics. In this I am following such Thomists as Louis Janssens and Jean Porter. 2 I. PRINCIPLES AND MORAL PRECEPTSA key development in questions 90-108 of the Prima secundae is the definition of praeceptum. There is sporadic use of the term in the Prima pars, and in the first 90 questions of the Prima secundae. 3 Until the treatise on law, however, the concept remains undefined. Aquinas defines it through an analogy with principium. A principium is a source or origin of something else. In question 75 of the Prima secundae the soul is called a principium of knowledge and motion, just as the eye is a principium of vision. 4 All speculative reasoning begins with the principia of non-contradiction. It serves as an
Medical professionals often deny patients who inject opioids a second or third heart valve replacement, even if such a surgery is medically indicated. However, such a position is not well defended. As this paper demonstrates, the ethical literature on the topic too often fails to develop and apply an ethical lens to analyse the issue of multiple valve replacements. This paper addresses this lacuna by analysing the case of Mr Walsh, a composite case which protects the identity of any one patient, through the principlist approach of Beauchamp and Childress. It argues that the hospital should offer Mr Walsh, a second valve replacement because the procedure is: medically indicated, autonomously requested, non-maleficent, beneficent and does not violate a formal account of justice. The paper concludes with clinical ethical guidelines for valve surgery for patients with opioid use disorder.
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