In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for obtaining a user-optimal load balancing scheme in heterogeneous distributed systems. We formulate the static load balancing problem in heterogeneous distributed systems as a noncooperative game among users. For the proposed noncooperative load balancing game, we present the structure of the Nash equilibrium. Based on this structure we derive a new distributed load balancing algorithm. Finally, the performance of our noncooperative load balancing scheme is compared with that of other existing schemes. The main advantages of our load balancing scheme are the distributed structure, low complexity and optimality of allocation for each user.
Abstract-The current cloud computing platforms allocate virtual machine instances to their users through fixed-price allocation mechanisms. We argue that combinatorial auction-based allocation mechanisms are especially efficient over the fixed-price mechanisms since the virtual machine instances are assigned to users having the highest valuation. We formulate the problem of virtual machine allocation in clouds as a combinatorial auction problem and propose two mechanisms to solve it. We perform extensive simulation experiments to compare the two proposed combinatorial auction-based mechanisms with the currently used fixed-price allocation mechanism. Our experiments reveal that the combinatorial auction-based mechanisms can significantly improve the allocation efficiency while generating higher revenue for the cloud providers.
Abstract-We perform a game theoretic investigation of the effects of deception on the interactions between an attacker and a defender of a computer network. The defender can employ camouflage by either disguising a normal system as a honeypot, or by disguising a honeypot as a normal system. We model the interactions between defender and attacker using a signaling game, a non-cooperative two player dynamic game of incomplete information. For this model, we determine which strategies admit perfect Bayesian equilibria. These equilibria are refined Nash equilibria in which neither the defender nor the attacker will unilaterally choose to deviate from their strategies. We discuss the benefits of employing deceptive equilibrium strategies in the defense of a computer network.
Cloud providers provision their various resources such as CPUs, memory, and storage in the form of Virtual Machine (VM) instances which are then allocated to the users. The users are charged based on a pay-as-you-go model, and their payments should be determined by considering both their incentives and the incentives of the cloud providers. Auction markets can capture such incentives, where users name their own prices for their requested VMs. We design an auction-based online mechanism for VM provisioning, allocation, and pricing in clouds that consider several types of resources. Our proposed online mechanism makes no assumptions about future demand of VMs, which is the case in real cloud settings. The proposed online mechanism is invoked as soon as a user places a request or some of the allocated resources are released and become available. The mechanism allocates VM instances to selected users for the period they are requested for, and ensures that the users will continue using their VM instances for the entire requested period. In addition, the mechanism determines the payment the users have to pay for using the allocated resources. We prove that the mechanism is incentive-compatible, that is, it gives incentives to the users to reveal their actual requests. We investigate the performance of our proposed mechanism through extensive experiments.
In this paper, we introduce the combinatorial auction model for resource management in grids. We propose a combinatorial auction-based resource allocation protocol in which a user bids a price value for each of the possible combinations of resources required for its tasks execution. The protocol involves an approximation algorithm for solving the combinatorial auction problem. We implement the new protocol in a simulated environment and study its economic efficiency and its effect on the system performance.
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