Introduction: Laboratory biosecurity is of continuously growing interest due to increasing concerns about deliberate misuse of biological materials and emerging biological risks. These risks continue to be magnified by globalization, the rapid pace of scientific development, and dual-use technologies. Worldwide laboratory capacities are expanding, which calls for concrete actions to improve laboratory biosafety and biosecurity practices to protect researchers and the community. Hence, laboratories require comprehensive biorisk management programs to minimize the risk of accidental and deliberate release of infectious biological materials. Objective: Malaysia has prioritized the concern of national biosecurity and aims to consolidate laboratory biosecurity performance to detect and prevent the deliberate release of biological agents. Methods: Two 3-day workshops were organized over the course of four months in which Malaysia collaborated with The Netherlands. This bilateral engagement aimed to integrate biosecurity practices in their national biorisk management programs, and resulted into a comprehensive biosecurity checklist for laboratory assessment and monitoring. Results: This biosecurity checklist is based on Malaysian and Dutch expert opinions and national and international guidelines and regulations. The biosecurity checklist is a survey-driven tool that consists of a set of concrete questions for each key biosecurity area, which are discussion points for assessment. Conclusion: We display a practical biosecurity checklist for laboratory assessment and monitoring. Although the presented checklist was the template for the specific Malaysia checklist, it could serve as a template for other countries.
This paper considers the biological weapons problem as a post-disarmament issue requiring 'management' or 'governance' rather than 'disarmament' or 'arms control'. This allows for a broader analysis of the BW problem, one where a range of relevant issues, threats, challenges and actors can be examined, as well as nation-states, international treaties, terrorist groups and the like. The paper therefore provides a more accurate depiction of the wide range of current efforts to minimise the chances of biology being misused for hostile purposes. It aims to explain how and why networks and non-state actors have emerged to play a bigger role in the governance of biological technologies.
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was the first international treaty to effectively prohibit an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. In its Preamble, the BWC clearly affirms the norm against the use of biology as a weapon by stating that such use would be 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind'. Few would dispute the strength of the norm against biological weapons, but the BWC itself, as the legal and widely accepted embodiment of this norm, requires continuous support and attention. Even after 40 years, it is not yet universal and its implementation is less than satisfactory. However, the treaty, and particularly the annual meetings of its States Parties in Geneva, have served as a venue in which all relevant stakeholders can come together to share information, experience and expertise and develop common understandings at the global level. In recent years, these meetings have been attended by a wide range of experts from national, regional and international entities from the public, private and civil sectors. International organisations such as the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Health Organization have been regular participants in the BWC meetings and their contributions are much appreciated by BWC States Parties. Cooperation and collaboration at the international level is also vital in facing the threats posed by the misuse of biological agents against humans, animals or plants. However, the recent Eighth BWC Review Conference was only able to find agreement on a small number of issues, which could put into question the role the BWC should play in countering biological threats in the future.
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