In this paper, we present an abductive argument for the existence of God from the experience of awe at natural beauty. If God's creative work is a viable explanation for why we experience awe at natural beauty, and there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation for the origins of such experiences, then we have defeasible evidence that God exists. To evaluate the argument's tenability, we assess the merits of the two main naturalistic frameworks that can be marshaled to answer the question of why human beings experience awe at natural beauty, Wilson's biophilia hypothesis, and Keltner and Haidt's prototype approach to awe. We show shortcomings of both accounts in explaining the relevant experiences and argue that the reliance of these accounts on an adaptationist reading of our aesthetic appreciation of nature entails a commitment to questionable hidden premises: that affordances themselves can figure in the subject's perceptual experience, and that experiences of awe have adaptive value. We maintain that the argument's "empirical" premise is tenable and conclude with directions for future research regarding the argument's "theological" premise.
Openness is a distinctive feature in the episodes of joint attention. In such an episode, everything is in the open, nothing is hidden (PEACOCKE, 2005, p. 298). But what is this metaphorical description supposed to grasp? On the common knowledge approach, openness is characterized by an infinite list of iterated perceptual knowledge attributions. This approach overloads the cognitive costs of joint attention. On the relational approach, openness is a primitive notion; the phenomenon results from the fusion of perceptions between the agents, a singular experience of co-percipience that explains joint attention for free. This paper aims to argue for an intermediate approach to explain openness. We offer here an account of openness in terms of nonwellfounded situations. We shall argue that it not only fully characterizes mutual awareness in a finite adequate way but that it also preserves the low cognitive burden of the co-presence situation.
Resumo: O debate contemporâneo sobre a cognição social tem sido marcado pela retomada da abordagem fenomenológica da empatia. Essa abordagem postula uma experiência perceptual direta com outras mentes, ao menos em situações típicas de interação. Meu objetivo neste artigo é investigar o alcance dessa tese. Tentarei mostrar que este alcance é mais limitado do que os proponentes da empatia estariam dispostos a aceitar. Ainda que haja uma experiência perceptual direta com outras mentes, essa experiência não envolve um grau de flexibilidade suficiente para o que é requerido em situações ordinárias de coordenação de ação, precisamente aquelas situações focadas pela abordagem fenomenológica. Esse problema poderá oferecer a ocasião de uma exploração futura sobre o papel de capacidades inferenciais em tais situações.
Although wonder has been the subject of much discussion within the philosophy and cognitive science of emotions concerning its perceptual and spiritual aspects, its cognitive aspects are not as clear. The main effort has been to clarify the effects this emotion has on cognition, notably aa broadening of its structures to accommodate a perceptual content marked by beauty, vastness, and complexity of detail. However, emotions can have the same effect on cognition without thereby being cognitive emotions themselves. In an attempt to demarcate the emotion of wonder, we will advance a thesis that aims at specifying its cognitive dimension, namely: wonder is an emotion that is a constitutive part of a metacognitive process by which the agent becomes sensitive to the limits of her conceptual apparatus. What results from this process are precisely the typical sensations which accompany this emotion, such as belonging and reverence. The paper is structured as follows. First, we will bring to the fore the problems inherent in understanding the cognitive emotion of wonder. Second, we will evince a pertinent case of metacognition and show in what way that capacity can be constituted by emotions. Third, we will elucidate the metacognitive character of wonder. Finally, we will offer a case to make clear the explanatory potential of our analysis, namely, the role of wonder in the formation and maintenance of religious belief. * I am deeply grateful to my colleague José Eduardo Porcher, who read, revised and commented on early versions of this work, and for his other efforts on my behalf.
O objetivo do artigo é apresentar uma concepção de crença teísta que permita a articulação de dois aspectos: reflexividade e aderência. O primeiro aspecto consiste na ideia de que a crença teísta aparece como resultado de uma reflexão acerca de um determinado tipo de experiência. O segundo aspecto consiste no caráter evocativo e transformador a crença teísta. De acordo com algumas abordagens, entretanto, se a crença teísta tivesse um caráter reflexivo, ela não teria o tipo de aderência que lhe é própria. Esse argumento pressiona a concepção da crença teísta como crença básica, a saber, como uma atitude proposicional que constitui a experiência. No entanto, há ao menos uma circunstância relevante de formação de crença teísta, a experiência de vastidão, em que a experiência deve ser concebida como independente de crenças. Para essa circunstância, a crença teísta deve ser concebida como reflexiva. Nesse caso, cabe mostrar de que modo ela pode ser aderente. Tendo em vista o marco teórico integrativo da cognição ancorada, mostraremos que o caráter reflexivo da crença teísta não anula o seu caráter aderente.
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