Efforts to identify the determinants of environmental policy success at the national level have largely been anecdotal and case study based. This article seeks to identify empirically the factors that drive environmental performance as measured by levels of urban particulates and sulfur dioxide and energy use per unit of GDP. Although the data are imperfect and causal linkages cannot be definitively established, the statistical analysis presented suggests that environmental results vary not only with income levels as suggested by the environmental Kuznets Curve literature but also with both the sophistication of a nation's regulatory regime and, perhaps more notably, its broader economic and social context. Thus, at every level of development, countries face policy choices that determine environmental quality in important ways. Strong environmental performance appears to be positively correlated with competitiveness, putting into question the presumed trade-off between economic progress and environmental gains. Although preliminary, these results provide evidence that environmental decision making can be made more data driven and analytically rigorous.

A B ST R ACT. This Article examines the tension between the demonstrable need for structured international cooperation in a world of interdependence and the political strain that arises whenever policymaking authority is lodged in global institutions. It argues that the tools of administrative law, which have been used to legitimate regulatory decisionmaking in the domestic context, should be deployed more systematically when policymaking is undertaken at the international level. While acknowledging the inevitable lack of democratic underpinnings for supranational governance, this Article highlights a series of other bases for legitimacy: expertise and the ability to promote social welfare; the order and stability provided by the rule of law; checks and balances; structured deliberation; and, most notably, the institutional design of the policymaking process as structured by principles and practices of administrative law. In developing the logic for procedural legitimacy as a foundation for good governance at the supranational scale, this Article advances a taxonomy of possible global administrative law tools. It then evaluates against this template of good governance procedures some existing decisionmaking procedures in the international trade, public health, and environmental policy regimes. The core conclusion is this: Even if supranational governance is limited and hampered by divergent traditions, cultures, and political preferences, developing a baseline set of administrative law tools and practices will strengthen whatever supranational policymaking is undertaken.

- Keywordsclosed loop competitiveness corporate environmental management eco-efficiency externalities remurce productivity I SummaryIn the emerging field of industrial ecology one of the unsettled questions is the degree t o which design for the environment, closing energy and materials loops, and other industrial ecology concepts apply at the firm level. In this article we examine this issue with a particular focus on We conclude that industrial ecology thinking will often be useful for firms seeking t o improve their resource productivity and thus their competitiveness.The systems perspective that industrial ecology promotes can help companies find ways t o add value or reduce costs both within their own production processes and up and down the supply chain. But industrial ecology cannot always be counted upon to yield competitive advantage at the firm level. In some cases, the cost of closing loops will exceed the benefits. In other cases, regulatory requirements do not fully internalize environmental costs, and thus polluting firms may gain temporary or permanent cost advantages relative to companies that attempt to eliminate all emissions. Finally, because industrial ecology focuses attention on materials and energy flows, it may not optimize other variables that contribute to competitiveness within the 8

No abstract

Efforts to identify the determinants of environmental policy success have largely been anecdotal and case study based. This article seeks to shift environmental policy analysis on to more analytically rigorous and empirical foundations. Using statistical analysis, we identify a set of factors that drive environmental performance as measured by levels of urban particulates, sulfur dioxide, and energy use per unit of GDP. Although the data are imperfect and causal linkages cannot be definitively established, the statistical analysis presented suggests that environmental results vary not only with income levels as suggested by the environmental Kuznet's curve literature but also with both the sophistication of a nation's regulatory regime and perhaps more notably, its broader economic and social circumstances.

This paper utilizes new data to evaluate the determinants of the political influence of thirty‐five manufacturing industries on the U.S. Congress during 1976–80. Several measures of influence serve to distinguish between political activity and success. Seller concentration and geopolitical dispersion increase both activity and success, but neither industry size nor leading‐firm size proves significant. We test whether political expenditures facilitate obtaining the favors conferred on an industry by its market structure or by influence independent of that strurture; statistical inference strongly confirms both roles.

Perceived conflict between trade liberalization and environmental protection can be traced to a number of issues. Some tensions relate to the environmental Kuznets curve and whether economic growth yields environmental benefits. Other concerns arise from efforts to address transboundary externalities and disputes over the role of trade measures as an environmental enforcement tool. Another set of issues centers on the risk of a race-toward-the-bottom regulatory dynamic and the limits of legitimate comparative advantage. This paper argues that, in an ecologically and economically interdependent world, trade and environmental policies are inescapably linked as a matter of descriptive reality and normative necessity.

to President Bill Clinton, cheered on by academics such as Richard Revesz, are eagerly seeking to return authority over environmental regulation to the states.' In the European Union, localist opponents of environmental decisionmaking in Brussels rally under the banner of "subsidiarity."2 And in debates over international trade liberalization, demands abound for the protection of "national sovereignty"3 in environmental regulation. All of these efforts presume that a decentralized approach to environmental policy will yield better results than more centralized programs. This presumption is misguided. While the character of some environmental concerns warrants a preference for local control, a sweeping push for decentralized regula