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Postulating anthropology as a science Boas, according to Harris, put the matter very succinctly: 'Anthropology is a science, but science is history'.1 Malinowski sought a scientific definition of culture in his turn. In a posthumous text entitled A Scientific Theory of Culture,2 he offered a minimal definition of 'science' for the humanistic scholar, which would thus be differentiated simultaneously from abstract thought and from common sense.The scientific treatment differs from that of common sense, first in that a student will extend the completeness and minuteness of survey much further and in a pedantically systematic and methodical manner; and secondly, in that the scientifically trained mind, will push the inquiry along really relevant lines, and towards aims possessing real importance.3 3 For Malinowski, the scientific attitude was as old as culture, in so far as the minimal definition of science is derived from some kind of practical activity. He arrived at this conclusion as much through his researches on non-Western peoples as thanks to the progress of modern physics, which made its appearance during the early years of the twentieth century.Our minimum definition implies that the first task of each science is to recognize its legitimate subject matter. It has to proceed to methods of true identification, or isolation of the relevant factors of its process. This is nothing else than the establishment of general laws, and of concepts which embody such laws. This, of course, implies that every theoretical principle must always be translatable into a method of observation, and again, that in observation we follow carefully the lines of our conceptual analysis. Finally, in all this the inspiration derived from practical problems ... is an invariable corrective of general theories.' A precondition for being able to act and participate in the process of social action is to have a certain theory of knowledge available which gives an account of reality, while also being operational, that is, presenting bridges between theory and empiricism. The history of Western culture has more often focused on the first term, theory, than on the second, empiricism; in reality, we have only confronted this question for two centuries. The whole history of metaphysics and some part of the history of science have attempted to resolve the question of being: what are we? However, the twentieth century was characterized by the appearance of a new question, meeting certain success at the start of the third millenium: what is happening to us?' The grand theory and the preoccupation with the search for the truth are no longer pertinent. Extreme rationalism has already found
In the passage from the Enneads devoted to discussing and defining the nature of time, it is written that first one must experience eternity, which, as everyone knows, is the model and archetype of time. This initial warning, which is especially serious because we trust in its sincerity, appears to wipe out all hope of finding common ground with its author.Jorge Luis Borges, History of Eternity So let us leave the Platonists to wander off down a blind alley Poor simpletons, they think they will find the secret of discourse about time in the link with eternity. Whereas I, who am powerless in the face of eternity, would prefer to ask: what link can be retained, in discourse about time, between past, present, and future? If there is some link, can the three kinds of time break free of their mutual bonds? Can predicting the future, a time that will be but has never existed before, be disconnected from what determines the future as a product of what already exists and what has already existed? Can the past be what it once was or will it always be what each age decides it should have been? Put this way, these questions lead to never-ending discussions in which each argument seems to retain its validity. So may I take the liberty of imposing some limits on the questions based on a dual distinction: the difference between a theoretical question and a practical one, and the difference between the content and the form of thought.When we formulate theoretical questions, our attention is not focused on what-oughtto-be or what-has-to-be-done, but on being itself. The intention is not to judge but to understand. When understanding occurs with a cognitive intent, the &dquo;for what&dquo; question is intrusive; this is not a question about understanding, but about the value of understanding. When Husserl invented epoche, he was simply asking us not to become allergic to theory in our hurry to form a judgement; judging needs to be put on hold to allow understanding to take place. Husserl's épochè is similar to Freud's 'floating attention'. Knowing and inquiring is not the same as running up the flags to praise or criticize the content of the knowledge. Praising and criticizing, by taking up an attitude vis-a-vis the facts, means going beyond them, transcending those which are candidates to be approached by knowledge, because the attitude to the facts adopted does not arise from them, cannot be deduced from them, and is not caused by them.On the other hand, when practical questions are put, what interests us is what-oughtto-be or what-has-to-be-done, and if being becomes our focus, it is to discover what to do with it and how to treat it; for instance, whether we should go along with it, use it, or ignore it, even questioning if it is worthy to know it. The practical approach is concerned with the value of things. Behind every practical question there is &dquo;yes or no&dquo;, approval or criticism.There would be coincidence between theoretical and practical aspects only where what I want to be was in fact the case and what is coi...
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