The critical aspects of biosafety, biosecurity, and biocontainment have been in the spotlight in recent years. There have also been increased international efforts to improve awareness of modern practices and concerns with regard to the safe pursuit of life sciences research, and to optimize current oversight frameworks, thereby resulting in decreased risk of terrorist/malevolent acquisition of deadly pathogens or accidental release of a biological agent, and increased safety of laboratory workers. Our purpose is to highlight how the World Health Organization’s (WHO) revised International Health Regulations (IHR[2005]), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 overlap in their requirements with regard to biosafety and biosecurity in order to improve the understanding of practitioners and policymakers and maximize the use of national resources employed to comply with internationally-mandated requirements. The broad range of goals of these international instruments, which are linked by the common thread of biosafety and biosecurity, highlight their significance as essential pillars of international health security and cross-cutting elements of biological nonproliferation. The current efforts of the Republic of Georgia to enhance biosafety and biosecurity in accordance with these international instruments are summarized.

Herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV-1) triggered apoptosis in hippocampal cultures, as determined by terminal deoxynucleotidyl transferase-mediated dUTP nick-end labeling (TUNEL) and immunohistochemistry with antibody specific for the large fragment of activated caspase 3. The levels of phosphorylated (activated) c-Jun N-terminal kinase (JNK) were also increased in HSV-1-infected hippocampal cultures as were the levels of activated c-Jun, its target. JNK activation was involved in HSV-1-induced apoptosis as evidenced by apoptosis inhibition with the JNK inhibitor SP600125. HSV-2 activated the mitogen-activated protein kinase/extracellular regulated protein kinase (MEK/ERK) survival pathway and did not trigger apoptosis in hippocampal cultures. The MEK specific inhibitor U0126 inhibited ERK activation and caused a significant increase in the percent TUNEL(+) cells in HSV-2-infected cultures, indicating that the failure of HSV-2 to trigger apoptosis is due to its ability to activate the MEK/ERK survival pathway. JNK was also activated in brain tissues from patients with HSV-associated acute focal encephalitis (HSE) that were positive for HSV-1 antigen. JNK activation correlated with apoptosis, as determined by immunohistochemistry with antibody to activated caspase 3 or cleaved poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase (PARP). The data suggest that HSE has an apoptotic component that may contribute to disease pathogenesis.

Introduction: Managing biological risks requires an organizational culture that holistically ensures the biosafety, biosecurity, and biocontainment of infectious disease agents and toxins, in addition to conducting science in a responsible manner, complying with relevant laws, regulations, guidelines, and policies, as well as emphasizing norms, values, and beliefs of the entire life sciences profession. Methods: Drawing upon the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel's (FESAP's) 2014 recommendation to "strengthen a culture that emphasizes biosafety, laboratory biosecurity, and responsible conduct in the life sciences," we undertook a comprehensive literature review of the culture of biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible conduct in the life sciences, including metrics by which to evaluate interventions at the organizational level. Results: We identified 4031 unique citations published from January 2001 to January 2017 by searching the MEDLINE/PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and Global Health databases. In addition, a subset of 326 articles was reviewed in full. Discussion: We found that while there were discussions in the literature about specific elements of culture (management systems, leadership and/or personnel behavior, beliefs and attitudes, or principles for guiding decisions and behaviors), there was a general lack of integration of these concepts, as well as limited information about specific indicators or metrics and the effectiveness of training or similar interventions. Conclusion: We concluded that life scientists seeking to foster a culture of biosafety and biosecurity should learn from the substantial literature in analogous areas such as nuclear safety and security culture, high-reliability organizations, and the responsible conduct of research, among others.

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