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The purpose of this study was to evaluate changes in nasal resistance to airflow in persons undergoing rapid maxillary expansion and to reevaluate the responses at a 1-year follow-up. Nasal resistance measurements, assessed in four modes (natural state, anterior nares dilation with Tygon tubing, following administration of decongestant, and nares dilation with tubing and decongestant), were taken on a group of 38 patients receiving rapid maxillary expansion and compared with a control group not receiving expansion. Thirty-three of the patients were reevaluated 9 to 12 months after expansion was completed. Eighteen subjects in the control group were also reevaluated. Oral/nasal airflow rates (percent nasality) were recorded for the control group and for some of the expansion patients. Results indicated that some subjects receiving rapid maxillary expansion had a significantly higher nasal resistance than the control group. There was a significant median reduction in nasal resistance following rapid maxillary expansion, measured in the natural state only, and this appeared to be stable up to 1 year after maximum expansion was obtained. Rapid maxillary expansion appeared to effect an expansion at the anterior nares, which contributes to nasal resistance reduction. Individual variation in nasal resistance values was considerable and hence the median response for the group was not a reliable estimate of individual response. Due to the high individual response variability, rapid maxillary expansion is not a predictable means of decreasing nasal resistance.

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How do people hold elected officials accountable for expected economic conditions in a system of government in which jurisdiction and responsibility are divided such as they are in the United States? Due to the president's visibility, people may hold all elected officials of the president's party responsible for economic conditions. Or, people may be able to differentiate between state and national economic conditions and jurisdictional responsibilities and hold governors of either party accountable for state economic conditions. I use ordered probit to analyze a pooled model of 13 individual-level mid-1990s Michigan opinion surveys and find no evidence that individuals consistently rely on a presidency-centered referenda model of cognition when evaluating the state's governor. Instead, gubernatorial performance ratings reflect an incumbent-centered accountability model. The evidence also suggests jurisdictional accountability, where gubernatorial evaluations are influenced by state economic expectations, but not by national economic expectations.