This study examines how the incentives related to ownership structure influence labor cost management decisions in publicly traded and privately held organizations. I document that public banks have more elastic labor cost structures than private banks, which suggests that public bank managers prefer greater flexibility to remove labor resources when desired. Consistent with public banks facing greater financial reporting pressures, I find that they reduce labor costs to avoid earnings declines. However, I also find that the use of labor cost reductions to manage required regulatory capital is more pronounced in private banks. Consistent with the explanation that access to the equity markets allows public firms to sell equity in lieu of cutting costs, I find that the use of labor cost reductions to manage capital requirements is concentrated in the subsample of banks with lower equity issuances. These findings suggest that while public ownership induces financial reporting pressure, it may also alleviate regulatory pressure through greater ability to sell equity.

We examine how suppliers' product market competition influences the relation between customer concentration and cost structure. Analyzing cost data from a sample of manufacturing firms, we find that suppliers exhibit more rigid cost structure when both product market competition and customer concentration are high. In further analysis, we find that the effect of competition on the relationship between customer concentration and cost structure is isolated to the COGS and COGM. Our results suggest that suppliers trade off the downside risk of having fixed costs that cannot be reassigned with the potential upside benefit of meeting major customer demands.

In this study, we examine how pre-managerial experience and performance relates to managerial success. Some prior research has documented that managers contribute to organization performance, but the link between specific manager characteristics and performance has been dubious because data about managers' prior work history are typically quite limited. We overcome this limitation by examining our research question in the context of Major League Baseball, where data on pre-managerial work history are available for a large subset of managers. This allows us to focus on two questions that have not been adequately addressed in prior studies. First, does success prior to becoming a manager translate into success as a manager? Second, what is the relative importance of measurable versus unobservable manager characteristics on performance?

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In this study, we examine the wage effects of no‐trade clauses in Major League Baseball. Using an accepted player salary equation and data from the 2003–2008 seasons, we find evidence that there is a trade‐off between monetary compensation and the risk reduction provided by a no‐trade clause. The results suggest that players may be able to simultaneously negotiate for a no‐trade clause and higher salaries, but this is constrained when players also seek to guarantee their income stream with long‐term contracts.

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