Binary file ES_Abstracts_Final_ECDC.txt matches

Objectives To assess the risk of transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 2009 influenza (pandemic A/H1N1) from an infected high school group to other passengers on an airline flight and the effectiveness of screening and follow-up of exposed passengers.Design Retrospective cohort investigation using a questionnaire administered to passengers and laboratory investigation of those with symptoms.Setting Auckland, New Zealand, with national and international follow-up of passengers.Participants Passengers seated in the rear section of a Boeing 747-400 long haul flight that arrived on 25 April 2009, including a group of 24 students and teachers and 97 (out of 102) other passengers in the same section of the plane who agreed to be interviewed.Main outcome measures Laboratory confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 infection in susceptible passengers within 3.2 days of arrival; sensitivity and specificity of influenza symptoms for confirmed infection; and completeness and timeliness of contact tracing.Results Nine members of the school group were laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic A/H1N1 infection and had symptoms during the flight. Two other passengers developed confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 infection, 12 and 48 hours after the flight. They reported no other potential sources of infection. Their seating was within two rows of infected passengers, implying a risk of infection of about 3.5% for the 57 passengers in those rows. All but one of the confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 infected travellers reported cough, but more complex definitions of influenza cases had relatively low sensitivity. Rigorous follow-up by public health workers located 93% of passengers, but only 52% were contacted within 72 hours of arrival.Conclusions A low but measurable risk of transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 exists during modern commercial air travel. This risk is concentrated close to infected passengers with symptoms. Follow-up and screening of exposed passengers is slow and difficult once they have left the airport.

The objective was to describe the current epidemiology and trends in New Zealand human leptospirosis, using descriptive epidemiology of laboratory surveillance and disease notification data, 1990-8. The annual incidence of human leptospirosis in New Zealand 1990-8 was 44 per 100,000. Incidence was highest among meat processing workers (163.5/100,000), livestock farm workers (91.7), and forestry-related workers (24.1). The most commonly detected serovars were Leptospira borgpetersenii serovar (sv.) hardjo (hardjobovis) (46.1%), L. interrogans sv. pomona (24.4%) and L. borgpetersenii sv. ballum (11.9%). The annual incidence of leptospirosis declined from 5.7/100,000 in 1990-2 to 2.9/100,000 in 1996-8. Incidence of L. borgpetersenii sv. hardjo and L. interrogans sv. pomona infection declined, while incidence of L. borgpetersenii sv. ballum infection increased. The incidence of human leptospirosis in New Zealand remains high for a temperate developed country. Increasing L. borgpetersenii sv. ballum case numbers suggest changing transmission patterns via direct or indirect exposure to contaminated surface water. Targeted and evaluated disease control programmes should be renewed.

The strategy in New Zealand (Aotearoa) to eliminate coronavirus disease requires that international arrivals undergo managed isolation and quarantine and mandatory testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. Combining genomic and epidemiologic data, we investigated the origin of an acute case of coronavirus disease identified in the community after the patient had spent 14 days in managed isolation and quarantine and had 2 negative test results. By combining genomic sequence analysis and epidemiologic investigations, we identified a multibranched chain of transmission of this virus, including on international and domestic flights, as well as a probable case of aerosol transmission without direct person-to-person contact. These findings show the power of integrating genomic and epidemiologic data to inform outbreak investigations.