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Energy efficiency is widely accepted as a simple and cost-effective way to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. It is accordingly a corner stone of European energy and climate policies. However, in formulation of explicit political energy efficiency goals as well as in monitoring these targets, discussions arise both concerning the concrete definition and the measurement. Accordingly, there is a lack of clarification and in-depth discussions of several fundamental aspects or dimensions of measuring energy efficiency, in particular in a political context. Here, we discuss and analyse two aspects of energy efficiency and ways to measure it, namely the formulation of a baseline and the accounting methods, in order to clarify ongoing discussions. We find that both top-down and bottom-up methods contain a series of "adjustment settings" which can strongly influence the degree of energy efficiency target achievement. Additionally, several baselines can be meaningfully defined and used in a political context. We find a factor of 10 or more between different meaningful definitions of energy efficiency easily achievable. Our results indicate that rigorous definitions should be used for formulating and monitoring energy efficiency targets in a political context if exactly the same understanding of target is to be achieved

This paper compares two flagship policies in the area of energy efficient building refurbishment, the German CO 2-Building Rehabilitation Programme and the Green Deal in the UK. Although both policies are essentially loan programmes to finance energy efficiency measures, the nature of the two policies is very different regarding scope, financial architecture, integration with other policies, and carbon reductions. The paper draws out the main differences of the programmes as well as similarities.

International audienceBetter leverage of public funding is essential in order to trigger the invest-ment needed for energy efficiency. In times of austerity governments in-creasingly look at policy instruments not funded by public expenditure and Energy Savings Obligations represent one option. Because Energy Savings Obligations are paid for by all energy customers, the degree to which they are able to raise additional private capital for energy efficiency invest-ments is crucial with regard to the financial burden on consumers. In this paper, we systematically assess how successful Energy Savings Obliga-tions were in levering capital from parties other than the obligated entities including private investors and other public bodies. We analyse three countries with substantial experience with Energy Savings Obligations, identify the main design differences and the effect this has on the degree of leverage. We conclude that the design of Energy Savings Obligations largely determines the degree of leverage and that that there appears to be a trade-off between high leverage and additionality

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