Purpose: A severe problem in supplier selection refers to moral hazard: suppliers not behaving in the expected way once contracted. Principal-agent theory could provide insights on how to reduce this problem. Because buyer-supplier relationships can be interpreted as principal-agent situations, the application of agency theory should facilitate improved supplier selection. Although theoretically compelling, empirical tests verifying this assumption are not prevalent. Regarding the advancement of theory, this paper tests whether both ex ante and ex post information asymmetries influence moral hazard. In particular, in the context of a globalizing economy with a subsequent increase in information asymmetries as a problem in supplier selection, this conceptual approach may be contributive.Design/methodology/approach: The authors use a set of 87 buyer-supplier relationships to conduct a test, applying a partial least squares model with latent variables. A particularity of the data set is that it contains information on ongoing as well as on discontinued relationships.Findings: The analysis indicated that both ex ante information asymmetries (operationalized by a reputation variable) and ex post asymmetries (operationalized by a monitoring variable) have shown to be significant and strong antecedents explaining the occurrence of moral hazard. Interestingly, and opposed to the common assumption, the length of a relationship and the amount of direct meetings have not revealed any explanatory significance. Buyer dependency hardly showed influence on supplier opportunism.Research limitations/implications: Data were collected from a multitude of buyer-supplier relationships from a single firm in the chemical-pharmaceutical industry. Generalizations to other industries still need to be tested. Socially desirable answering behavior cannot fully be excluded because relationship discontinuation is not a desirable situation. In terms of theory implications, this research adds to the notion that both hidden action and hidden intention can lead to moral hazard.Practical implications: An agency-based analysis can be operationalized with the help of an agency-based supplier classification portfolio. It might be of particular value to firms to discuss those suppliers that scored high in risk of opportunism but did not (yet) reveal any signs of moral hazard. Finally, the strong explanatory power

No abstract

Purpose In light of increasingly tight buyer–supplier relationships, opportunism is a problem of increasing relevance. So far, opportunism has mainly been researched as a detrimental action by suppliers and interpreted with an institutional economics lens. Recent conceptual work, however, has argued more for a behavioral approach to operations management, suggesting benefits of taking a social capital perspective on opportunism. Based on a large empirical sample of buyer–supplier relations, this paper aims to provide an empirical study using social capital as theoretical lens. Further, it analyzes both supplier and buyer opportunism at the same time. Design/methodology/approach The paper, through following a quantitative approach, considers the interacting dyad of buyer and supplier opportunism, its antecedents as well as its performance implications. Findings Findings did not support the expectation that supplier opportunism will be countered by buyer opportunism in a single relationship. However, social capital in the form of cognitive and relational capital has been found as a good predictor of opportunism. This study proposes new measures for structural capital. Further the study confirms the detrimental effect of opportunism on performance of the buyer–supplier relationship, highlighting the mediating role of innovation as building block of relational competitive advantage. Research limitations/implications Previous studies on opportunism in buyer–supplier relations were mostly transaction cost-oriented, thus neglecting the behavioral aspects of exchange processes. Introducing social capital theory revealed to be a rewarding amplification of the perspective. Next, most research up till now was focused on explaining supplier opportunism only. This study contributes by analyzing both sides of the interacting dyad. Finally, this research closes a research gap by not only explaining the occurrence of opportunism but by also testing its performance outcomes. Accordingly, this study contributes to the opportunism literature, social capital theory development and to the management of buyer–supplier relations. Practical implications Building up cognitive and relational capital is likely to be a tool to reduce the danger of opportunism – both with the partner firm, as well as inside the own organization. As such, firms need to make sure that both forms of social capital are present to a higher extent. If this is not the case, opportunistic actions on both buying and supplying side might occur which have damaging impacts on the generation of innovation as well as the achievement of strategic advantages. Originality/value While previous studies have focused on explaining supplier opportunism, an analysis of both sides of the interacting dyad between buyer and supplier opportunism is missing. Not only does this research provides further insights with regard to the latter, but further considers the role of social capital as underlying factor explaining both buyer and supplier opportunism. Also, this research answers the call on more research about the relation between opportunism and performance, specifically focusing on innovation and strategic advantage generation.

No abstract

Clusters have gained considerable attention from regional planners and policymakers. In order to support their decision process, a "top-down" analysis has evolved, the regional agglomeration as a whole being the object of analysis. The importance of cluster-membership for the management of individual firms and their "bottom-up" view of a cluster has attracted much less attention. This paper proposes a "dual" approach: based on an integral view of clusters a surveytool is developed to capture the top-down perspective. It is supplemented with a bottom-up view using structured interviews in a core firm and an analysis of its supply structure based on quantitative firm-level data. The application of the dual approach is demonstrated using the case of a medical technology cluster. A dual approach fosters a multi-faceted understanding of a cluster, can produce very applicable results and offers a more comprehensive actor-integration.