This paper endorses the idea that the right to contest provided for by art. 22, § 3 GDPR, actually is the apex of a progressive set of tools the data subject has at his disposal to cope with automatic decisions and it should work as an architectural principle to create contestable systems. But in order to achieve that important role, it cannot be reduce to the right of human intervention, also provided for by art.22, § 3, nor to a generic opposition to the outcome of the automatic processing. Thus, drawing from a thorough analysis of the relationships among the rights included in art. 22, § 3 GDPR as well as from the juridical proper meaning of “contestatio”, it is concluded that the right to contest has its own proper nature as a hybrid substantial-processual right that is able to give concrete shape to all the other rights indicated in art. 22, § 3, included the much discussed right to explanation.

Recourse to precedents in legal adjudication is a source of intriguing theoretical challenges and serious practical difficulties. That is especially so when we have to do not with domestic precedents but with foreign ones, that is, with decisions taken by foreign courts and international judicial institutions, particularly when there is no formal obligation for a court to resort to foreign law. Can a case decided by the judiciary of a different legal ordereven if that case is remote and that legal order operates under different procedural rules and substantive laws-have any bearing on a dispute arising domestically here and now? Should such a foreign precedent be acknowledged to have any (formal) binding force on the case in question? How could the practice of following foreign precedents be justified? This paper is primary meant to lay the theoretical basis on which those questions can be addressed. The basis on which we proceed in answering those questions essentially lies in a theory of legal reasoning that, for lack of a better phrase, can be labelled a dialectical approach informed by standards of discursive rationality.

Data Mining (DM) is the analytical activity aimed at revealing new “knowledge” from data useful for further decision-making processes. These techniques have recently acquired enormous importance as they seem to fit perfectly the requests of the so called “Data Driven World”. In this paper, first I give an overview of DM, and of the most relevant criticisms raised so far. Then using a well-known case study and the European General Data Protection Regulation as benchmark, I show that there are some specific ambiguities in this use of “knowledge” which are relevant for the ethical and legal assessment of DM.