This study analyzes the information conveyed by the restatements of financial reports. We argue that restatements contain news about the investment projects of the restating firms' competitors. This news causes competitors to revise their beliefs about the projects' value, and to modify their subsequent investment decisions. Accordingly, we hypothesize that changes in competitors' investments after restatement announcements are related to news in the restatements. Consistent with our prediction, we find that changes in competitors' investments following restatement announcements are significantly related to various proxies for news in the restatements, such as competitors' and restating firms' abnormal returns at the restatement announcements. We conclude that restatements convey information about the investment projects of restating firms' competitors.

We explore whether disclosures in the Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) have spillover effects for investment and investment efficiency, and whether spillover effects vary with competition. We focus on the tone of MD&A disclosures and document that the association between a company's investments and the tone of its rivals' MD&A disclosures is positive. Moreover, this association is moderated by competition; it is stronger when firms operate in industries that have lower entry costs, are larger, and have less substitutable products. We obtain similar results for investment efficiency. Overall, our evidence suggests that MD&A disclosures have spillover effects for investment that can improve investment efficiency, and that spillover effects are moderated by industry competition.

This study analyzes the information conveyed by the restatements of financial reports. We argue that restatements contain news about the investment projects of the restating firms' competitors. This news causes competitors to revise their beliefs about the projects' value, and to modify their subsequent investment decisions. Accordingly, we hypothesize that changes in competitors' investments after restatement announcements are related to news in the restatements. Consistent with our prediction, we find that changes in competitors' investments following restatement announcements are significantly related to various proxies for news in the restatements, such as competitors' and restating firms' abnormal returns at the restatement announcements. We conclude that restatements convey information about the investment projects of restating firms' competitors. * We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee, Douglas J. Skinner (editor),

This paper debates whether Say on Pay can fix executive pay. We argue that Say on Pay benefits executive pay when shareholders' voice offsets CEO power and mitigates directors' information deficiencies. We admonish however that Say on Pay may raise novel problems. The pay resulting from Say on Pay can harm stakeholders whose interests differ from those of shareholders influential in paysetting. Moreover, boards may resist shareholders' intervention in pay-setting and, accordingly, manage compensation disclosures to ensure a passing shareholder vote. Consequently, Say on Pay may not only fail to remedy suboptimal pay but also legitimize it. 1We thank Timothy Devinney, David Maber, Patrik Marier and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. All errors are our own.

Hybrid organizations harbor different and often conflicting institutional logics, thus facing the challenge of sustaining their hybridity. Crucial to overcoming this challenge is the identification process of organizational actors. We propose a theorization of how power relations affect this process. More specifically, we argue that an actor’s power influences their own professional identity: an increase [decrease] in their power, via the heightened [diminished] control that this power provides them over organizational discourse, boosts [threatens] their identity. Our theorization has implications for the longevity of a newly adopted logic within an organization. If the new logic modifies incumbent power relations, the identities of (formerly and newly) powerful individuals are influenced, which may lead these individuals to promote or resist the new logic, thereby affecting the odds that the logic will survive within the organization. We illustrate our theorization with a case study in a professional service firm. Our study contributes to nascent research on hybrid organizations by emphasizing the role of power and agency in the longevity of hybridity.