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Purpose The authors study the effect of increasing environmental awareness on shareholders' activism. Specificallly, this study aims to examine whether growing environmental awareness is reflected in more aggressive environmental shareholder proposals. Design/methodology/approach This study uses the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster as an exogenous event that increased shareholders' environmental awareness. This study analyzes the spill’s effect on the tone of proposals about environmental issues and nonenvironmental topics. Findings After the disaster, the tone of environmental proposals (i.e. the treatment group) is significantly more negative. In contrast, the tone of nonenvironmental proposals (i.e. the control group) is unaffected. This study interprets this finding as direct evidence that the oil spill led to increased shareholder environmental activism through proposals that targeted the environmental risks surrounding the business more aggressively. By contrast, this study finds no effect of the oil spill on the tone of managers' responses to the proposals, consistent with managers refraining from emphasizing environmental threats. Originality/value Anecdotal evidence and recent studies suggest a link between environmental disasters and shareholder pressure for corporate change. However, no prior research has investigated the channel through which shareholders could have exerted such pressure or has looked for direct evidence of it in the negotiations between shareholders and managers. By finding such evidence in shareholder proposals, this study fills in this gap.

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Theoretical propositions suggest that mandatory and voluntary disclosures are related. Empirical studies focusing on this relationship provide mixed evidence as they found that mandatory and voluntary disclosures are either complements or substitutes. Relying on a proprietary, hand-collected database about the risk disclosure of oil companies, we find that voluntary risk disclosure increases with the level of mandatory risk disclosure up to a threshold above which companies reduce their voluntary disclosures. We also find that this relationship depends on the firm-level uncertainty, and it is sharpened in the presence of high exposure to liquidity risk. Overall, our results contribute to the debate on whether and on which level disclosure should be regulated. JEL Classification: M41, G14