To cite this version:Claire Naiditch, Radu Vranceanu. Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model. Economic Systems, Elsevier, 2009, 33 (1)
AbstractThis paper analyzes the interaction between migrants'income and remittances and between remittances and the labor supply of residents. The model is cast as a two-period game with imperfect information about the residents'real economic situation. Residents subject to a good economic situation may behave as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to manipulate remitters' expectations. The latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the remitted amount accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium, residents who really are victims of the bad economic outlook, are penalized as compared to the perfect information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their type by drastically cutting working hours, thus further enhancing their precarity right when their economic situation is the worst.
We provide a theoretical framework to analyze how financial constraints hinder migration. Introducing wealth heterogeneity and borrowing constraints into a random utility maximization model of migration, we find evidence of multilateral resistance to migration stemming from borrowing constraints. We calibrate the model on 22 European countries, and we show that omitting the constraints biases upward the estimation of bilateral migration rates. We then simulate an increase in the bilateral cost of migration to the United Kingdom. We find that omitting the constraints biases downward the change entailed by the cost increase in the bilateral rates of migration to all destinations.
Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status in the eyes of left home family and friends. They can remit money in order to signal their economic success and increase their status. We show that, if migrants' income is private information, unsuccessful migrants might accept a worsening of their living conditions and send back home large amounts of remittances only in order to make residents believe that they are successful. In some cases, successful migrants can signal their true favorable economic situation by remitting an even larger amount. The game presents various equilibria that di¤er with respect to the proportion and nature of the migrants who sacri…ce consumption opportunities to status revealing actions.
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