The rise of China has become a central debate in the academic field of international relations. In the Western world, the scholars within this debate can roughly be divided into the ‘pessimists’ and the ‘optimists’. The pessimists see in the rise of China an inevitable hegemonic war, or at least prolonged and intense zero-sum competition, with the US as it will seek to replace the latter and overturn the existing liberal international order. The optimists, on the other hand, see an opportunity for sustained Western dominance through selective accommodation of China in exchange for China’s acceptance of the existing norms and values of the liberal international order and continued US dominance. In this paper, we maintain that both perspectives in the debate are misleading. We argue that China seeks to push for a multipolarized world rather than replacing the US, and that Beijing prefers the relations between the great powers within a multipolar order to be based on the conception of a ‘community of common destiny for humankind’. We also argue that China is unlikely to accept the existing norms and values of the liberal international order as they reflect and reinforce Western dominance. Rather, China has become an ‘order-shaper’ seeking to reform the existing institutions to better reflect the interests of the ‘Rest’, and establish new networks and institutions that will complement and augment the existing arrangements of the liberal international order, instead of challenging it.

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Some scholars argue that established great powers tend to launch preventive wars to halt and reverse power transition processes, while others argue that it is the rising great powers that initiate revisionist challenges. Through the application of the preventive war model and the theory of strategic competition, this article argues that we should identify the initiation of a hegemonic war in the agency of established great powers during power transition processes and that hegemonic confrontations, in the age of nuclear weapons, are limited to the diplomatic domain where great powers will compete for relative strategic influence in the world. The argument is then applied for a re-examination of China–USA relations as this provides a novel ground for testing its explanatory power. Based on our findings, the article further argues that the USA has been the instigator of a preventive strategic competition against China aimed to halt and reverse the ongoing power transition process.