Corporate political activity is both a long-standing preoccupation and an area of innovation for sociologists. We examine the limitations of investigating business unity without focusing directly on processes and outcomes and then review studies of five types of business political action that offer lenses into corporate power in the United States: engagement in electoral politics, direct corporate lobbying, collective action through associations and coalitions, business campaigns in civil society, and political aspects of corporate responsibility. Through these avenues, we highlight four shifts since the 1970s: (a) increasing fragmentation of capitalist interests, (b) closer attention to links between business lobbying and firms' social embeddedness, (c) a turn away from the assumption that money buys political victories, and (d) new avenues of covert corporate influence. This body of research has reinvigorated the classic elitist/pluralist debate while also raising novel questions about how business actors are adapting to (and generating changes within) their sociopolitical environments.

In 2004 an aggressive plan was instituted aiming to achieve nationwide transmission control of schistosomiasis by 2015. Here, we report a longitudinal study on the control of schistosomiasis in Anhui province, China. Using a mathematical model, we compared the effects of different control strategies implemented in the study area. During the 5-year study period, a 60.8% reduction in human prevalence was observed from 2005 (7.95%) to 2009 (3.1%), and snail infection decreased from 0.063% in 2005 to zero in 2009. Results of the model agree well with the first 3-year field observations and suggest continuous decrease in human infections in the last 2 years, whereas the last 2-year field observations indicated that human infections appeared to be stable even with continuous control. Our findings showed that the integrated control strategy was effective, and we speculated that other factors besides bovines might contribute to the local transmission of the disease.

BackgroundSchistosomiasis transmission is typically focal. Understanding spatial variations of Schistosoma infections and their associated factors is important to help to invent site-specific intervention strategies.MethodsA five-year longitudinal study was carried out prospectively in 12 natural villages, Guichi district of Anhui province. A GIS-based spatial analysis was conducted to identify geographic distribution patterns of schistosomiasis infections at the household scale.ResultsThe results of the spatial autocorrelation analysis for 2005 showed that there were significant spatial clusters of human infections at the household level, and these results were in agreement with that of the spatial scan statistic. As prevalence of infections in humans decreased over the course of control, the spatial distribution of these infections became less heterogeneous.ConclusionsThe findings imply that it may be necessary to re-assess risk factors of S. japonicum transmission over the course of control and to adjust accordingly control measures in the communities.

State-directed but market-oriented forms of regulation, especially environmental examples like cap-and-trade and ecological offsetting, have proliferated in the past two decades, but sociologists have been slow to theorize these broad institutional shifts. This article offers a framework for explaining these processes of regulatory marketization. First, I argue that institutions of this sort are examples of what I call command-and-commodify regulation, a mode of regulation that distinctively hybridizes economic and authoritative dimensions of power. Second, I explain how and why one example of command-and-commodify regulation, species conservation banking, emerged and remained concentrated in California, but did not so easily develop in other American states. Finally, abstracting from the case, I argue that the concept of market reconstruction is useful for developing a more general theory of the ways that social conflicts and mobilization reconfigure regulatory power, and thus give rise to new modes of regulation. Together, a theory of command-and-commodify regulation and market reconstruction may be useful for explaining the development of a wide variety of environmentally focused and other regulatory institutions.

Failure has become an increasingly important theme of debate in the literature on neoliberal natures. In this article we take up this topic with respect to ecological offsetting, often regarded as an exemplar of market-oriented conservation. Comparing the case of species banking which emerged in California in the 1990s with frustrated efforts to implement a biodiversity offsetting programme in England beginning in 2010, we develop a novel analytical framework for explaining why this kind of environmental market-making may or may not be successful in different contexts. Drawing on work in geography on the neoliberalisation of nature and insights from economic sociology, we characterise ecological offsetting as ‘command-and-commodify’ regulation: a peculiar form of hybrid ecological regulation which depends on an institutional mix of ‘authoritative’ and ‘economic’ power to function. In California, these kinds of environmental markets initially emerged at a moment of compromise, contingent on an embrace of ‘market’ solutions to environmental problems on the one hand, and a somewhat paradoxical expansion of authoritative power to ecologically regulate land development, on the other. In England, by contrast, deep fiscal austerity and deregulatory zeal, combined with resistance from nearly every quarter, initially undermined the possibility of balancing economic and authoritative power, which we argue is necessary for the construction of viable ecological offsetting. Reflecting on themes in the wider literature, we conclude by questioning whether the English experience is indicative of sharpening tensions between economy and ecology in the late neoliberal era.