This paper presents estimates of the impact on re-employment and earnings of the two most popular active labour programmes used during the economic transition in Hungary: retraining and public service employment (PSE). To adjust for non-random assignment of programme participants, net impacts were computed using matched pair samples and regression models. The evidence suggests retraining may improve the chance for reemployment, is unlikely to improve re-employment earnings, but may improve job durability. Net societal benefits could be improved by retraining relatively more males, older persons, and those with less education. PSE does not appear to provide a reliable path to a regular non-subsidized job, and may even lower re-employment earnings. PSE might best be viewed as an income transfer programme having the collateral benefit of maintaining basic work habits. The net societal impact of PSE could increase if it involved relatively more females and older persons. Copyright The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1997.

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Unemployment insurance is intended to reduce hardship by providing labor force members with partial wage replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment. However, in performing this income maintenance function, unemployment insurance may prolong spells of unemployment. Evidence from a field experiment conducted in Illinois in 1984 suggested that offering unemployment insurance claimants a modest cash bonus for rapid reemployment would increase the speed of return to work and reduce program costs. In 1988 a similar experiment, examining several different bonus offers, was conducted in the state of Washington. Evidence from the Washington experiment indicates that bonus offers do change job seeking behavior, but that only relatively generous bonus offers—about six times the weekly benefit amount—should be expected to significantly change the behavior of people eligible for unemployment benefits.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Cost-Effectiveness of Targeted Reemployment Bonuses AbstractTargeting reemployment bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified as most likely to exhaust benefits is estimated to reduce benefit payments. We show that targeting bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services systems can improve cost effectiveness. Since estimated average benefit payments do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen is gradually tightened, we find that narrow targeting is not optimal. The best candidate is a low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement.