Essentialists claim that at least some individuals or kinds have essences. This raises an important but little-discussed question: how do we come to know what the essence of something is? This paper examines Aristotle's answer to this question. One influential interpretation (viz., the Explanationist Interpretation) is carefully expounded, criticized, and then refined. Particular attention is given to what Aristotle says about this issue in DA I.1, APo II.2, and APo II.8. It is argued that the epistemological claim put forward in DA I.1 differs from that put forward in APo II.2 and II.8, contrary to what has been claimed by Explanationists, and that each of these distinct epistemological claims rests on a distinct non-epistemological thesis about essence. Consequently, an 'Enriched Explanationist Interpretation' is developed which takes into account both of the aforementioned elements in Aristotle's epistemology of essence. The paper concludes by highlighting an insight the preceding exegetical discussion offers to contemporary essentialists seeking to explain how we come to know what something's essence is.
According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, one person, Christ, has both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. This claim has given rise to the coherence objection, i.e., the objection that it is impossible for one individual to have both sets of attributes. Several authors have offered responses which rely on the idea that Christ has the relevant human properties in virtue of having a concrete human nature which has those properties. I show why such responses should be rejected and, in light of that, propose an alternative response to the coherence objection.
The coherence objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that it is impossible for one individual to have both the attributes of God and the attributes of a human being. This article examines Thomas Aquinas's answer to this objection. I challenge the dominant, mereological interpretation of Aquinas's position and, in light of this challenge, develop and defend a new alternative interpretation of Aquinas's response to this important objection to Christian doctrine.One and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, [was] made known in two natures which are unconfused, unchanged, undivided, unseparated, with the difference of the natures being in no way removed on account of the union but rather what is proper (idiotēs/proprietas) to each nature is preserved and comes together in one person (prosopon/persona) and one hypostasis, not parted or divided in two persons, but [in] one and the same Son and only-begotten God, Word, Lord Jesus Christ. 1 In short, the Word Incarnate, Christ, is claimed to be one person, one hypostasis, who has two natures, one divine and one human. Consequently, Christ is said to have both the attributes proper to a human being and the attributes proper to God. 1 My translation, based on the Greek and Latin texts in Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 86.6 Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, 135. 7 Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, 127. 8 Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, 153. 9 I do not directly address the textual merits of the "Thomistic" approach which Gorman develops as an alternative to the mereological interpretation. Nonetheless, the textual arguments which I offer to support my own alternative to the mereological interpretation provide reason to accept my alternative interpretation over Gorman's.10 For example, the Council of Chalcedon says that Christ is "begotten before the ages from the Father in respect to his divinity (secundum deitatem), but in the last days, the same, on account of us and our salvation, [born from] the Virgin Mary, God-bearer, in respect to his
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