Montaigne is almost certainly a skeptic, and it is often thought that his skepticism leads him to subscribe to moral relativism. Indeed, there are passages in the Essais that seem to support this widespread interpretation. However, in this essay the author argues that Montaigne's skepticism does not lead to moral relativism. In fact, not only does it not lead him to abandon the notion of objective moral truth, but it is precisely his skepticism that allows Montaigne to see how despite the fact that his moral objectivism is unjustifiable, it is nonetheless defensible.
This article attempts to contribute to the literature on what has become known as “student relativism” by suggesting that in many cases it is a symptom of a broader and equally problematic pre-reflective epistemological framework that students often bring with them to the study of philosophy. It goes on to describe the notion of a “dialectical fact,” and to propose that this concept can be a useful pedagogical tool for helping students to progress beyond that framework.
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