We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting --but not in new --democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights. JEL O00, 010 3

This article presents a statistical study of the determinants of democracy in the postwar period. Important variables are found to be former status as a British colony, island status, the share of the population professing Islam, the share of the population that is of European descent, penetration of the English language during British colonial rule, and a measure of ethnic homogeneity. The evidence suggests that cultural beliefs and institutional inheritances are important determinants of the viability of democracy in poor countries, even when controlling for literacy and socioeconomic development.NOTE: The authors thank John Adams for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this article.

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This book presents the theory of capital utilization, a discussion of the econometrics of capital utilization, and econometric tests of the theory using international data. Capital utilization, defined as the proportion of time that capital is working productively, is mainly affected by shift-working. Capital utilization is an important economic variable that has received serious attention from economists only since the mid-1960s In the first part, the authors provide a synthesis of current knowledge, combining a consistent statement of existing theory with some major extensions. In the second part, they turn to the econometrics, first discussing the appropriate methodology and then testing the theory on data from several countries. This empirical work is considerably more sophisticated than previous studies on this topic. Having established the theory and tested it, they move on to consider policy, the relationship between capital utilization and economic growth, and the place of shift-work in the dual economy.

Abstract:Economics has changed enormously since Professor Ha-Joon Chang burst onto the scene in the early 1990s. His critiques of mainstream economics are far more applicable to the discipline at that time than they are now. Whatever the shortcomings of the current literature on institutions and development, progress is not being held back by conceptual blinders imposed by economic orthodoxy. Game theory and behavioral economics have enriched the menu of models acceptable in the professional journals. More important, empirical standards have greatly advanced. Behavioral models are being confronted with computerized games and even with in-the-field experiments, especially in poor countries where recruiting experimental subjects is cheaper. The recent literature does not merely undermine traditional assumptions; it offers parsimonious interpretations that help us to understand the economy and the polity better than before.