for helpful comments, and Jose Ricardo Villanueva Lira and Bryony MacLeod for excellent research assistance. I acknowledge the financial support of the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland.

Public support has long been thought crucial for the vitality and survival of democracy. Existing research has argued that democracy also creates its own demand: through early-years socialization and later-life learning, the presence of a democratic system coupled with the passage of time produces widespread public support for democracy. Using new panel measures of democratic mood varying over 135 countries and up to 30 years, this article finds little evidence for such a positive feedback effect of democracy on support. Instead, it demonstrates a negative thermostatic effect: increases in democracy depress democratic mood, while decreases cheer it. Moreover, it is increases in the liberal, counter-majoritarian aspects of democracy, not the majoritarian, electoral aspects that provoke this backlash from citizens. These novel results challenge existing research on support for democracy, but also reconcile this research with the literature on macro-opinion.

This paper extends Ellis and Stimson's (2012) study of the operational-symbolic paradox using issue-level measures of ideological incongruence based on respondent positions and symbolic labels for these positions across 14 issues. Like Ellis and Stimson, we find that substantial numbers-over 30 percent-of Americans experience conflicted conservatism. Our issue-level data reveal, furthermore, that conflicted conservatism is most common on the issues of education and welfare spending. In addition, we also find that 20 percent of Americans exhibit conflicted liberalism. We then replicate Ellis and Stimson's finding that conflicted conservatism is associated with low sophistication and religiosity, but also find that it is associated with being socialized in a post-1960s generation and using Fox News as a main news source. Finally, we show the important role played by identities, with both conflicted conservatism and conflicted liberalism linked with partisan and ideological identities, and conflicted liberalism additionally associated with ethnic identities.

At the microlevel, comparative public opinion data are abundant. But at the macrolevel—the level where many prominent hypotheses in political behavior are believed to operate—data are scarce. In response, this paper develops a Bayesian dynamic latent trait modeling framework for measuring smooth country–year panels of public opinion even when data are fragmented across time, space, and survey item. Six models are derived from this framework, applied to opinion data on support for democracy, and validated using tests of internal, external, construct, and convergent validity. The best model is reasonably accurate, with predicted responses that deviate from the true response proportions in a held-out test dataset by 6 percentage points. In addition, the smoothed country–year estimates of support for democracy have both construct and convergent validity, with spatiotemporal patterns and associations with other covariates that are consistent with previous research.

Relying upon Gibson's (2004) theory equating lack of prejudice with interracial "reconciliation," we investigate racial attitudes based on a 2004 nationally representative survey of South Africans. We begin by documenting substantial group-based differences in intergroup prejudice, with Blacks being considerably less reconciled with Whites as compared to the three racial minorities' levels of reconciliation with Blacks. We also discover that the Black majority has become less reconciled with Whites over the period from Gibson's survey (in 2001) to the current survey (in 2004). Improvement in racial attitudes is observed among the other three groups. We next investigate intergroup contact as an explanation of differences in attitudes, finding some effects of mere contact and powerful effects of intimate contact. However, the consequences of contact differ across the various racial groups.There can be little doubt that the future of South Africa's nascent democracy depends upon the development of cooperative rather than conflictual intergroup relations. South Africa is a multiracial, multiethnic, and multilingual society, and it is inconceivable that this will change. As intergroup relations go, so goes the future of the country.In recognition of the importance of intergroup attitudes, Gibson (2004) designated intergroup tolerance as one of his four pillars of reconciliation. The other three pillars are support for a human rights culture, political tolerance, and the extension of legitimacy to the institutions of the new political dispensation in the