Background Before 2020, mental disorders were leading causes of the global health-related burden, with depressive and anxiety disorders being leading contributors to this burden. The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has created an environment where many determinants of poor mental health are exacerbated. The need for up-to-date information on the mental health impacts of COVID-19 in a way that informs health system responses is imperative. In this study, we aimed to quantify the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the prevalence and burden of major depressive disorder and anxiety disorders globally in 2020. Methods We conducted a systematic review of data reporting the prevalence of major depressive disorder and anxiety disorders during the COVID-19 pandemic and published between Jan 1, 2020, and Jan 29, 2021. We searched PubMed, Google Scholar, preprint servers, grey literature sources, and consulted experts. Eligible studies reported prevalence of depressive or anxiety disorders that were representative of the general population during the COVID-19 pandemic and had a pre-pandemic baseline. We used the assembled data in a meta-regression to estimate change in the prevalence of major depressive disorder and anxiety disorders between pre-pandemic and mid-pandemic (using periods as defined by each study) via COVID-19 impact indicators (human mobility, daily SARS-CoV-2 infection rate, and daily excess mortality rate). We then used this model to estimate the change from pre-pandemic prevalence (estimated using Disease Modelling Meta-Regression version 2.1 [known as DisMod-MR 2.1]) by age, sex, and location. We used final prevalence estimates and disability weights to estimate years lived with disability and disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) for major depressive disorder and anxiety disorders. Findings We identified 5683 unique data sources, of which 48 met inclusion criteria (46 studies met criteria for major depressive disorder and 27 for anxiety disorders). Two COVID-19 impact indicators, specifically daily SARS-CoV-2 infection rates and reductions in human mobility, were associated with increased prevalence of major depressive disorder (regression coefficient [ B ] 0·9 [95% uncertainty interval 0·1 to 1·8; p=0·029] for human mobility, 18·1 [7·9 to 28·3; p=0·0005] for daily SARS-CoV-2 infection) and anxiety disorders (0·9 [0·1 to 1·7; p=0·022] and 13·8 [10·7 to 17·0; p<0·0001]. Females were affected more by the pandemic than males ( B 0·1 [0·1 to 0·2; p=0·0001] for major depressive disorder, 0·1 [0·1 to 0·2; p=0·0001] for anxiety disorders) and younger age groups were more affected than older age groups (−0·007 [–0·009 to −0·006; p=0·0001] for major depressive disorder, −0·003 [–0·005 to −0·002; p=0·0001] for anxiety disorders). We estimated that the locations hit hardest by the pandemic in 2020, as measured with decreased human mobility and daily SARS-CoV-2 infection rate, had th...

No abstract

ImportanceSome individuals experience persistent symptoms after initial symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection (often referred to as Long COVID).ObjectiveTo estimate the proportion of males and females with COVID-19, younger or older than 20 years of age, who had Long COVID symptoms in 2020 and 2021 and their Long COVID symptom duration.Design, Setting, and ParticipantsBayesian meta-regression and pooling of 54 studies and 2 medical record databases with data for 1.2 million individuals (from 22 countries) who had symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection. Of the 54 studies, 44 were published and 10 were collaborating cohorts (conducted in Austria, the Faroe Islands, Germany, Iran, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US). The participant data were derived from the 44 published studies (10 501 hospitalized individuals and 42 891 nonhospitalized individuals), the 10 collaborating cohort studies (10 526 and 1906), and the 2 US electronic medical record databases (250 928 and 846 046). Data collection spanned March 2020 to January 2022.ExposuresSymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection.Main Outcomes and MeasuresProportion of individuals with at least 1 of the 3 self-reported Long COVID symptom clusters (persistent fatigue with bodily pain or mood swings; cognitive problems; or ongoing respiratory problems) 3 months after SARS-CoV-2 infection in 2020 and 2021, estimated separately for hospitalized and nonhospitalized individuals aged 20 years or older by sex and for both sexes of nonhospitalized individuals younger than 20 years of age.ResultsA total of 1.2 million individuals who had symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection were included (mean age, 4-66 years; males, 26%-88%). In the modeled estimates, 6.2% (95% uncertainty interval [UI], 2.4%-13.3%) of individuals who had symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection experienced at least 1 of the 3 Long COVID symptom clusters in 2020 and 2021, including 3.2% (95% UI, 0.6%-10.0%) for persistent fatigue with bodily pain or mood swings, 3.7% (95% UI, 0.9%-9.6%) for ongoing respiratory problems, and 2.2% (95% UI, 0.3%-7.6%) for cognitive problems after adjusting for health status before COVID-19, comprising an estimated 51.0% (95% UI, 16.9%-92.4%), 60.4% (95% UI, 18.9%-89.1%), and 35.4% (95% UI, 9.4%-75.1%), respectively, of Long COVID cases. The Long COVID symptom clusters were more common in women aged 20 years or older (10.6% [95% UI, 4.3%-22.2%]) 3 months after symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection than in men aged 20 years or older (5.4% [95% UI, 2.2%-11.7%]). Both sexes younger than 20 years of age were estimated to be affected in 2.8% (95% UI, 0.9%-7.0%) of symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections. The estimated mean Long COVID symptom cluster duration was 9.0 months (95% UI, 7.0-12.0 months) among hospitalized individuals and 4.0 months (95% UI, 3.6-4.6 months) among nonhospitalized individuals. Among individuals with Long COVID symptoms 3 months after symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection, an estimated 15.1% (95% UI, 10.3%-21.1%) continued to experience symptoms at 12 months.Conclusions and RelevanceThis study presents modeled estimates of the proportion of individuals with at least 1 of 3 self-reported Long COVID symptom clusters (persistent fatigue with bodily pain or mood swings; cognitive problems; or ongoing respiratory problems) 3 months after symptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Spectacular economic growth in China suggests the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has somehow gotten it right. A key hypothesis in both economics and political science is that the CCP's cadre evaluation system, combined with China's geography-based governing logic, has motivated local administrators to compete with one another to generate high growth. We raise a number of theoretical and empirical challenges to this claim. Using a new biographical database of Central Committee members, a previously overlooked feature of CCP reporting, and a novel Bayesian method that can estimate individual-level correlates of partially observed ranks, we find no evidence that strong growth performance was rewarded with higher party ranks at any of the postreform party congresses. Instead, factional ties with various top leaders, educational qualifications, and provincial revenue collection played substantial roles in elite ranking, suggesting that promotion systems served the immediate needs of the regime and its leaders, rather than encompassing goals such as economic growth.

Background National rates of COVID-19 infection and fatality have varied dramatically since the onset of the pandemic. Understanding the conditions associated with this cross-country variation is essential to guiding investment in more effective preparedness and response for future pandemics. MethodsDaily SARS-CoV-2 infections and COVID-19 deaths for 177 countries and territories and 181 subnational locations were extracted from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation's modelling database. Cumulative infection rate and infection-fatality ratio (IFR) were estimated and standardised for environmental, demographic, biological, and economic factors. For infections, we included factors associated with environmental seasonality (measured as the relative risk of pneumonia), population density, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, proportion of the population living below 100 m, and a proxy for previous exposure to other betacoronaviruses. For IFR, factors were age distribution of the population, mean body-mass index (BMI), exposure to air pollution, smoking rates, the proxy for previous exposure to other betacoronaviruses, population density, age-standardised prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and cancer, and GDP per capita. These were standardised using indirect age standardisation and multivariate linear models. Standardised national cumulative infection rates and IFRs were tested for associations with 12 pandemic preparedness indices, seven health-care capacity indicators, and ten other demographic, social, and political conditions using linear regression. To investigate pathways by which important factors might affect infections with SARS-CoV-2, we also assessed the relationship between interpersonal and governmental trust and corruption and changes in mobility patterns and COVID-19 vaccination rates. Findings The factors that explained the most variation in cumulative rates of SARS-CoV-2 infection between Jan 1, 2020, and Sept 30, 2021, included the proportion of the population living below 100 m (5•4% [4•0-7•9] of variation), GDP per capita (4•2% [1•8-6•6] of variation), and the proportion of infections attributable to seasonality (2•1% [95% uncertainty interval 1•7-2•7] of variation). Most cross-country variation in cumulative infection rates could not be explained. The factors that explained the most variation in COVID-19 IFR over the same period were the age profile of the country (46•7% [18•4-67•6] of variation), GDP per capita (3•1% [0•3-8•6] of variation), and national mean BMI (1•1% [0•2-2•6] of variation). 44•4% (29•2-61•7) of cross-national variation in IFR could not be explained. Pandemic-preparedness indices, which aim to measure health security capacity, were not meaningfully associated with standardised infection rates or IFRs. Measures of trust in the government and interpersonal trust, as well as less government corruption, had larger, statistically significant associations with lower standardised infection rates. High levels of government and interpersonal trust, as wel...

Social distancing policies are critical but economically painful measures to flatten the curve against emergent infectious diseases. As the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19 spread throughout the United States in early 2020, the federal government issued social distancing recommendations but left to the states the most difficult and consequential decisions restricting behavior, such as canceling events, closing schools and businesses, and issuing stay-at-home orders. We present an original dataset of state-level social distancing policy responses to the epidemic and explore how political partisanship, COVID-19 caseload, and policy diffusion explain the timing of governors' decisions to mandate social distancing. An event history analysis of five social distancing policies across all fifty states reveals the most important predictors are political: all else equal, Republican governors and governors from states with more Trump supporters were slower to adopt social distancing policies. These delays are likely to produce significant, on-going harm to public health.

No abstract

Context: Social distancing is an essential but economically painful measure to flatten the curve of emergent infectious diseases. As the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19 spread throughout the United States in early 2020, the federal government left to the states the difficult and consequential decisions about when to cancel events, close schools and businesses, and issue stay-at-home orders. Methods: We present an original, detailed dataset of state-level social distancing policy responses to the epidemic, then apply event history analysis to study the timing of implementation of five social distancing policies across all fifty states. Results: The most important predictor of when states adopted social distancing policies is political: All else equal, states led by Republican governors were slower to implement such policies during a critical window of early COVID-19 response. Conclusions: Continuing actions driven by partisanship, rather than public health expertise and scientific recommendations, may exact greater tolls on health and broader society.