Abstract. Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) enabled road vehicles are on the brink of actualizing an important application of mobile ad hoc networks. It is crucial that the messages exchanged between the vehicles and between the vehicles and specialized infrastructure be reliable, accurate and confidential. To this end, we propose to identify the security threats inherent in the emerging DSRC Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) architecture. We rank the identified threats according to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute's (ETSI) threat analysis methodology. We also discuss possible countermeasures to the most critical threats.

Increasingly ubiquitous wireless technologies require novel localization techniques to pinpoint the position of an uncooperative node, whether the target is a malicious device engaging in a security exploit or a low-battery handset in the middle of a critical emergency. Such scenarios necessitate that a radio signal source be localized by other network nodes efficiently, using minimal information. We propose two new algorithms for estimating the position of an uncooperative transmitter, based on the received signal strength (RSS) of a single target message at a set of receivers whose coordinates are known. As an extension to the concept of centroid localization, our mechanisms weigh each receiver's coordinates based on the message's relative RSS at that receiver, with respect to the span of RSS values over all receivers. The weights may decrease from the highest RSS receiver either linearly or exponentially. Our simulation results demonstrate that for all but the most sparsely populated wireless networks, our exponentially weighted mechanism localizes a target node within the regulations stipulated for emergency services location accuracy.

SummaryA rogue insider, in a wireless network, is an authenticated member that exploits possession of a valid identity in order to launch an attack. A typical example is the transmission of a verifiable message containing false or incomplete information. An important step, in enabling the network authorities to attribute an attack message to its originator, involves locating the physical source of the transmission. We propose a probabilistic scheme to determine the location of a transmitting rogue, with a degree of confidence, using the relative signal strength received by neighboring devices, even if the effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP) employed by the rogue is unknown. The relative received signal strength (RSS) between pairs of trusted receivers are combined with a range of possible EIRP values to construct an area in Euclidian space bounded by minimum and maximum distance hyperbolas. The area contained within the intersection of multiple hyperbola pairs pinpoints the location of the rogue transmitter with a specific level of confidence.

Abstract. Increasingly ubiquitous wireless technologies require novel localization techniques to pinpoint the position of an uncooperative node, whether the target be a malicious device engaging in a security exploit or a low-battery handset in the middle of a critical emergency. Such scenarios necessitate that a radio signal source be localized by other network nodes efficiently, using minimal information. We propose two new algorithms for estimating the position of an uncooperative transmitter, based on the received signal strength (RSS) of a single target message at a set of receivers whose coordinates are known. As an extension to the concept of centroid localization, our mechanisms weigh each receiver's coordinates based on the message's relative RSS at that receiver, with respect to the span of RSS values over all receivers. The weights may decrease from the highest RSS receiver either linearly or exponentially. Our simulation results demonstrate that for all but the most sparsely populated wireless networks, our exponentially weighted mechanism localizes a target node within the regulations stipulated for emergency services location accuracy.

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