Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to domino effects, where the failure of one bank results in the failure of other banks not directly affected by the initial shock. Terms of use: Documents inRecent work in economic theory shows that this risk of contagion depends on the precise pattern of interbank linkages. We use balance sheet information to estimate the matrix of bilateral credit relationships for the German banking system and test whether the breakdown of a single bank can lead to contagion. We find that the financial safety net (institutional guarantees for saving banks and cooperative banks) considerably reducesbut does not eliminate -the danger of contagion. Even so, the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 15 % of the banking system in terms of assets.

No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to domino effects, where the failure of one bank results in the failure of other banks not directly affected by the initial shock. Terms of use: Documents inRecent work in economic theory shows that this risk of contagion depends on the precise pattern of interbank linkages. We use balance sheet information to estimate the matrix of bilateral credit relationships for the German banking system and test whether the breakdown of a single bank can lead to contagion. We find that the financial safety net (institutional guarantees for saving banks and cooperative banks) considerably reducesbut does not eliminate -the danger of contagion. Even so, the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 15 % of the banking system in terms of assets.

We study the output costs of 40 systemic banking crises since 1980. Most, but not all, crises in our sample coincide with a sharp contraction in output from which it took several years to recover. Our main findings are as follows. First, the current financial crisis is unlike any others in terms of a wide range of economic factors. Second, the output losses of past banking crises were higher when they were accompanied by a currency crisis or when growth was low at the onset of the crisis. When accompanied by a sovereign debt default, a systemic banking crisis was less costly. And, third, there is a tendency for systemic banking crises to have lasting negative output effects.

Researchers at central banks increasingly turn to counterfactual simulations to estimate the danger of contagion owing to exposures in the interbank loan market. The present paper summarises the findings of such simulations, provides a critical assessment of the modelling assumptions on which they are based, and discusses their use in financial stability analysis. On the whole, such simulations suggest that contagious defaults are unlikely, but cannot be fully ruled out, at least in some countries. If contagion does take place, then it could lead to the breakdown of a substantial fraction of the banking system, thus imposing high costs to society. However, when interpreting these results, one has to bear in mind the potential bias caused by the very strong assumptions underlying the simulations. While robustness tests indicate that the models might be able to correctly predict whether or not contagion could be an issue and, possibly, also identify critical institutions, they are less suited for stress testing or for the analysis of policy options in crises, primarily due to their lack of behavioural foundations. Going forward, more work is needed on how to attach probabilities to the individual scenarios and on the microfoundations of the models.

The literature on the tail behavior of asset prices focuses mainly on the foreign exchange and stock markets, with only a few articles dealing with bonds or bond futures. The present article addresses this omission. It focuses on three questions using extreme value analysis: (a) Does the distribution of Bund future returns have heavy tails? (b) Do the tails change over time? (c) Does the tail index provide information that is not captured by a standard VaR approach? The results are as follows: (a) The distribution of high-frequency returns of the Bund future is indeed characterized by heavy tails. The tails are thinner for lower frequencies, but remain significantly heavy even for daily data. (b) There are statistically significant breaks in the tails of the return distribution. (c) The likelihood of extreme price movements suggested by extreme value theory differs from that obtained by standard risk measures. This suggests that the tail index does indeed provide information not contained in volatility measures.

The flow of information between futures and spot prices may vary over time, in particular during periods of stress. This article analyses the information content of the Bund Future and German government bonds during 1998 and test whether it is constant over time. The use of high-frequency data permits us to capture possible imperfections in the information flows between the two markets. We measure the contributions of trading on the spot and futures markets to price discovery using the information shares approach by Hasbrouck (1995) as well as a recently proposed approach based on the Gonzalo-Granger decomposition. A state-space approach is used to estimate the underlying VECM in the presence of missing values. We test for structural breaks in the pricing relationship between the spot and futures markets and estimate break dates. Although most information is incorporated into prices in the futures market, this does not mean that the spot market is irrelevant for prices discovery. Under normal market conditions, the underlying bonds contribute to 19 to 33 % of the variation in the efficient price. The informational role of the spot market vanishes during episodes of stress. For example, during the two weeks after

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