We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk salient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. (JEL: C93, H26, K42)

This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is interpreted as a social norm for tax compliance. The norm strength, depending on the share of evaders in the society, is endogenously derived. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative, as their evasion decision depends on the other agents' compliance. We characterize an equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence and study the impact of tax and deterrence policies on compliance. Our analysis is then extended to the case of a society which consists of heterogenous communities where individual evasion decisions are embedded in a complex social structure. In this scenario, behavior is crucially influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this framework, we discuss the role of belief management and belief leadership as alternative policy tools.JEL classification: H26; Z13; K42.

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This paper identifies spillovers from law enforcement. Our approach makes use of micro data on compliance with TV license fees that allow us to distinguish between households who were subject to enforcement and those who were not. Using snowfall as an instrument for local inspections, we find a striking response of households to increased enforcement in their vicinity: on average, three detections make one additional household comply with the law. As compliance rises significantly among those who had no exposure to field inspections, our findings establish a substantial externality in enforcement.JEL classification: K42, C23, D83

Forthcoming in the European Economic Review We implement a field experiment to study the impact of reminder messages on dental health prevention. Patients who are due to schedule a checkup receive no reminder, a neutral reminder postcard, or reminders including additional information on the benefits of prevention. Our results document a strong impact of reminders. Within one month after receiving a reminder, the fraction of patients who make a checkup appointment more than doubles. The effect declines slightly over time, but remains economically and statistically significant. Including additional information in the reminders does not significantly increase response rates relative to the neutral reminder. Finally, our data indicates that applying reminders repeatedly neither strengthens nor weakens their effects.