Salespeople face increasingly complex work environments, both externally with customers and internally with various departments in their own organizations. Because managing such customer and organizational complexity is crucial to performance, the authors conceptualize and develop measures of customer and organizational complexity and examine the effects on salesperson outcomes. In line with job demands-resources theory, salespeople leverage personal and supervisory resources to manage complexity. The test of the conceptual model uses matched salespeople–sales manager data gathered from a large business-to-business firm. The empirical findings reveal that personal resources (sales self-efficacy) help manage complexity in general but create greater role stress in the face of customer complexity. The effectiveness of supervisory resources (transactional leadership behavior) is contingent on the type of complexity and the personal resources available to a salesperson. These results indicate not only how salespeople manage different complexities but also how sales managers should adapt their leadership behaviors to enhance salesperson performance.

Cross-selling offers tremendous benefits for both vendors and customers. However, up to 75% of all cross-selling initiatives fail, usually for sales forcerelated reasons. Yet prior research has largely ignored the role of salespeople in the field of cross-selling. Using a motivation-opportunity-ability (MOA) framework, this research addresses factors that determine a salesperson's cross-selling performance, including the predominant role of the selling team as a social environment in which individual behavior occurs. A dataset of 231 industrial salespeople working in 55 teams reveals that 37% of overall variation in behavior is caused by differences across teams. The team-specific hypotheses, based on social norms and reputation theory, are tested with a hierarchical linear modeling approach with matched data from three sources. Individual cross-selling motivation has a stronger effect when a selling team has strong cross-selling norms, and in the specific context of cross-selling, selling team reputation can constrain individual behavior that might damage that reputation. Salespeople also develop beliefs about the reasons for their team reputation, including its cross-selling ability, which can reduce an individual salesperson's reputational concerns and hence reinforce individual cross-selling behavior. These results have significant theoretical and managerial implications.

Although cross-selling offers significant benefits for both vendors and customers, three-quarters of all cross-selling initiatives fail, typically for sales force–related reasons. Prior research examining the antecedents of salespeople's product adoption has not yet shown whether or under which conditions such adoption behavior leads to better salesperson cross-selling performance. The authors develop a model of the role of supervisory behavior, compensation-based controls, and their interactions in enhancing the effect of salespeople's adoption behavior on cross-selling performance in a complex selling context. To test the model, the authors use a matched, multilevel data set from company records and surveys of salespeople and sales managers working in a biotech firm. The analysis shows that transformational leadership enhances the effect of salespeople's product portfolio adoption on cross-selling performance, whereas transactional leadership diminishes the effect. Furthermore, the effect of leadership type depends on whether cross-selling incentives are provided: the positive performance effect of transformational leadership is crowded out when monetary incentives are provided, and the negative effect of transactional leadership becomes even more negative. These results have significant theoretical and managerial implications.

Recent marketing research has identified mixed effects of luxury companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement on customer-level outcomes. To gain a better understanding of these effects, we develop a conceptual framework in which we propose that, unless carefully implemented, CSR engagement leads to lower financial performance, decreased customer loyalty, and elevated extrinsic CSR attributions for luxury companies. These effects are exacerbated if consumers actively deliberate on the company’s CSR efforts. However, luxury companies can mitigate these pitfalls and reap the potential rewards of CSR engagement by (1) engaging in company-internal, especially employee-focused CSR instead of company-external, philanthropic CSR or (2) framing their brands as sustainable instead of exclusive. We find consistent support for our theorizing in five empirical studies. The results contribute to existing knowledge on stakeholder reactions to luxury brands’ CSR and can help managers successfully navigate the implementation of CSR in luxury contexts.

Extant research established that customers’ expectations play an ambivalent role in the satisfaction formation process: While higher expectations are more difficult to meet and thus cause dissatisfaction, they simultaneously increase satisfaction via customers’ perceived performance owing to a placebo effect. However, to date, knowledge is scarce on the question under which conditions either the positive or negative effect of expectations on satisfaction prevails. Building on information processing theory, the authors hypothesize that an essential contingency of the indirect, placebo-based effect is the degree to which customers are able and motivated to process a service experience. Three studies with a total of over 4,000 customers in different service contexts provide strong evidence for this hypothesis. Thus, managers are well advised to provide a realistic or even understated prospect if the service context favors customers’ ability or motivation to evaluate. Conversely, if customers are neither able nor motivated to evaluate the service, increasing customer expectations represents a viable strategy to enhance satisfaction. Relatedly, if customers hold low service expectations, managers should foster customers’ ability and motivation to evaluate the service. In contrast, if service expectations are high, managers may benefit from reducing the likelihood that customers overly focus on the service performance.