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It has been argued that the traditional regulatory approach of the Endangered Species Act, based on land-use restrictions, has failed to protect endangered species on private land. In response, there has been a call for the use of incentives to complement this regulatory approach. This paper examines the potential of incentives programs to elicit conservationoriented management choices from landowners. Data obtained from a survey of nonindustrial private forest owners in Oregon and Washington is used to examine the effectiveness of various incentives. The results indicate that incentives, in particular compensation and assurances, can be effective in increasing the conservation effort provided by landowners. The results also suggest that conservation policy for private lands could be improved by relying on a combination of incentives, including financial incentives and assurances, rather than exclusively on the threat of regulation.

This article uses the 2007 Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey database developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to assess the impact of water scarcity and climate on irrigation decisions for producers of specialty crops, wheat, and forage crops. We estimate an irrigation management model for major crops in the West Coast (California, Oregon, and Washington), which includes a farm‐level equation of irrigated share and crop‐specific equations of technology adoption and water application rate (orchard/vineyard, vegetable, wheat, alfalfa, hay, and pasture). We find that economic and physical water scarcity, climate, and extreme weather, such as frost, extreme heat, and drought, significantly impact producers’ irrigation decisions. Producers use sprinkler technologies or additional water applications to mitigate risk of crop damage from extreme weather. Water application rates are least responsive to surface water cost or groundwater well depth for producers of orchard/vineyard. Water supply institutions influence producers’ irrigation decisions. Producers who receive water from federal agencies use higher water application rates and are less likely to adopt water‐saving irrigation technologies for some crops. Institutional arrangements, including access to distinct water sources (surface or ground) and whether surface water cost is fee based, also affect the responsiveness of water application rates to changes in surface water cost. The analysis provides valuable information about how producers in irrigated agricultural production systems would respond and adapt to water pricing policies and climate change.

This paper integrates economic and physical models to assess how federal crop revenue insurance programs might affect land use, cropping systems, and environmental quality in the U.S. Corn Belt region. The empirical framework includes econometric models that predict land conversion, crop choices, and crop rotations at the parcel-level based on expectation and variance of crop revenues, land quality, climate conditions, and physical characteristics at each site. The predictions are then combined with site-specific environmental production functions to determine the effect of revenue insurance on nitrate runoff and leaching, soil water and wind erosion, and carbon sequestration. Results suggest that crop insurance will have small impacts on conversions of non-cropland to cropland, and somewhat more significant impacts on crop choice. These changes in crop mix have small impacts on agricultural pollution.

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