Although performance on laboratory-based implicit bias tasks often is interpreted strictly in terms of the strength of automatic associations, recent evidence suggests that such tasks are influenced by higher-order cognitive control processes, so-called executive functions (EFs). However, extant work in this area has been limited by failure to account for the unity and diversity of EFs, focus on only a single measure of bias and/or EF, and relatively small sample sizes. The current study sought to comprehensively model the relation between individual differences in EFs and the expression of racial bias in three commonly used laboratory measures. Participants (N=485) completed a battery of EF tasks (session 1) and three racial bias tasks (session 2), along with numerous individual difference questionnaires. The main findings were as follows: (1) measures of implicit bias were only weakly intercorrelated; (2) EF and estimates of automatic processes both predicted implicit bias and also interacted, such that the relation between automatic processes and bias expression was reduced at higher levels of EF; (3) specific facets of EF were differentially associated with overall task performance and controlled processing estimates across different bias tasks; (4) EF did not moderate associations between implicit and explicit measures of bias; and (5) external, but not internal, motivation to control prejudice depended on EF to reduce bias expression. Findings are discussed in terms of the importance of global and specific EF abilities in determining expression of implicit racial bias.

The downstream consequences of a priming induction range from changes in the perception of objects in the environment to the initiation of prime-related behavior and goal striving. Although each of these outcomes has been accounted for by separate mechanisms, we argue that a single process could produce all three priming effects. In this article, we introduce the situated inference model of priming, discuss its potential to account for these divergent outcomes with one mechanism, and demonstrate its ability to organize the priming literatures surrounding these effects. According to the model, primes often do not cause direct effects, instead altering only the accessibility of prime-related mental content. This information produces downstream effects on judgment, behavior, or motivation when it is mistakenly viewed as originating from one's own internal thought processes. When this misattribution occurs, the prime-related mental content becomes a possible source of information for solving whatever problems are afforded by the current situation. Because different situations afford very different questions and concerns, the inferred meaning of this prime-related content can vary greatly. The use of this information to answer qualitatively different questions can lead a single prime to produce varied effects on judgment, behavior, and motivation.

No abstract

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in on Oct 31 2016 (see record 2016-52334-001). ] The effect of primes (i.e., incidental cues) on human behavior has become controversial. Early studies reported counterintuitive findings, suggesting that primes can shape a wide range of human behaviors. Recently, several studies failed to replicate some earlier priming results, raising doubts about the reliability of those effects. We present a within-subjects procedure for priming behavior, in which participants decide whether to bet or pass on each trial of a gambling game. We report 6 replications (N = 988) showing that primes consistently affected gambling decisions when the decision was uncertain. Decisions were influenced by primes presented visibly, with a warning to ignore the primes (Experiments 1 through 3) and with subliminally presented masked primes (Experiment 4). Using a process dissociation procedure, we found evidence that primes influenced responses through both automatic and controlled processes (Experiments 5 and 6). Results provide evidence that primes can reliably affect behavior, under at least some conditions, without intention. The findings suggest that the psychological question of whether behavior priming effects are real should be separated from methodological issues affecting how easily particular experimental designs will replicate.

We describe the situated inference model and discuss how it may contribute to better understanding priming effects and their absence. The model suggests that priming effects result when primes make certain ideas more likely to come to mind and those ideas are misattributed to one's own thoughts, interpreted in light of situational affordances. This perspective organizes a range of moderators identified in previous priming studies. We also describe new research that has tested the model's predictions. Finally, we consider the implications of the model for debates about the nature and replicability of priming effects on higher order cognition and behavior.Sometimes simple ideas combine to create something surprising. The effects of incidental stimuli (primes) on higher order thought and behavior are surely surprising, and this has contributed to both enthusiasm and skepticism about priming effects. We have argued that the appearance and disappearance of priming effects can be understood based on the combination of three simple premises.The first is that primes tend to increase the accessibility of related information, making certain thoughts and feelings more likely to come to mind. The second is that people tend to assume that their thoughts and feelings are about whatever they are attending to at the moment (even when the thoughts were actually caused by something else; see Higgins, 1998). And the third is that people tend to use accessible thoughts and feelings to guide responses to the situations in which they find themselves. From this perspective, priming is expected only when all three of these processes coincide. Stated simply, priming effects result when primes make certain ideas more likely to come to mind and those ideas are misattributed to one's own thoughts, interpreted in light of situational affordances. To know how a

No abstract

As prominently highlighted by Charles Darwin, music is one of the most mysterious aspects of human nature. Despite its ubiquitous presence across cultures and throughout recorded history, the reason humans respond emotionally to music remains unknown. Although many scientists and philosophers have offered hypotheses, there is little direct empirical evidence for any perspective. Here we address this issue, providing data which support the idea that music evolved in service of group living. Using 7 studies, we demonstrate that people's emotional responses to music are intricately tied to the other core social phenomena that bind us together into groups. In sum, this work establishes human musicality as a special form of social cognition and provides the first direct support for the hypothesis that music evolved as a tool of social living. In addition, the findings provide a reason for the intense psychological pull of music in modern life, suggesting that the pleasure we derive from listening to music results from its innate connection to the basic social drives that create our interconnected world.

Esta es la versión de autor del artículo publicado en: This is an author produced version of a paper published in: El acceso a la versión del editor puede requerir la suscripción del recurso Access to the published version may require subscription Past research has found that environmental primes can automatically initiate unconscious goal striving. Recent models of priming have suggested that this effect might be moderated by validation processes. According to a goal validation perspective, primes should cause changes in one's motivational state to the extent people have confidence in the prime-related mental content.Across three experiments we provided the first direct empirical evidence for this goal validation account. Using a variety of goal priming manipulations (cooperation versus competition, achievement, and self-improvement versus saving money) and validity inductions (power, ease, and writing about confidence), we demonstrated that the impact of goal primes on behavior occurs to a greater extent when conditions foster confidence (versus doubt) in mental contents.Indeed, when conditions foster doubt, goal priming effects are eliminated or counter to the implications of the prime. The implications of these findings for research on goal priming and validation processes are discussed.Key words: goal pursuit, automaticity, metacognition, validation GOAL VALIDATION 3 From primed construct to motivated behavior: Validation processes in goal pursuitThe study of self-regulation and goal pursuit is a fundamental topic in psychology (Vohs & Baumeister, 2011) with widespread implications for human thought and behavior. At a cognitive level, goals are abstract structures in memory that can become accessible through contextual cues and guide behavior toward the attainment of desired end states (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). Although historically thought to be relatively deliberative in nature (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998;Locke & Latham, 1990), contemporary research indicates that goals can be both activated and pursued outside of conscious awareness. For example, Chartrand and Bargh (1996) demonstrated simple priming manipulations, such as those previously used to activate traits or stereotypes (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979), can also produce complex, motivated behavior. These priming manipulations have produced motivated behavior for goals as diverse as achievement (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001), seeking casual sex (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004), forming impressions of others (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), dieting (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003), and knowledge seeking (Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003).Once activated, primed goals operate in the same manner as consciously selected ones.That is, goal priming produces all of the hallmarks of conscious goal pursuit including increases in goal strength over time, persistence in the face of obstacles, and resumption after interruption (Bargh et al., 2001; see also, Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007). In addition, success and failure at n...