Chinese MNCs in perspective Perhaps the first and most important point to make is that Chinese MNCs are, in many respects, like other state-owned MNCs operating in Africa, for example France's Elf-Aquitaine or South Africa's Eskom. In the French case, Elf-Aquitaine has been highly politicised, building upon or even defining France's Africa policy in particular countries such as Gabon and Angola. The close proximity between French business and political interests, manifested by the presence of oil company executives in the inner circle at the Elysee Palace as well as the circulation of key political elites such as Jean-Christophe Mitterrand within political and business circles, has been a feature of France's post-independence Africa policy from the outset. 2 Moreover, the modus operandi of foreign policy makers in Paris has been to construct policy around a network of personal relationships with individual African leaders, bolstered by a web of bilateral agreements in trade, finance, development assistance and defence. 3 The result has been, much to the dismay of many in France, a convergence between the interests of the oil company, the national armaments industry and the government's development policy that has led to, in its worst manifestations, French troops being sent into African countries to quell popular uprisings against local dictators. 4 Much of the thrust of the seemingly perennial efforts at reform of France's Africa policy has been aimed, with limited success, at untangling this complex set of relations with the continent. South Africa's parastatal, Eskom, represents another form of MNC in Africa whose strategy and operations blend national concerns with those of the continent's major power supplier. The convergence between South African economic interests surrounding the hydroelectric potential of the Congo River in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which Eskom seeks to exploit as South Africa searches for new power sources, has played a major part in Pretoria's foreign policy calculations towards that country. 5 According to Daniel and Lutchman: It is little wonder then that the South African government has committed so much in the way of time and effort, as well as military peacekeepers, to the task of bringing political stability to the DRC and to ending the endemic conflict in particularly the eastern region (Ituri) of the country. 6

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One of the most notable features of the forging of China's new activist foreign policy towards Africa is its emphasis on the historical context of the relationship. These invocations of the past, stretching back to the 15th century but rife with references to events in the 19th century and the cold war period, are regular features of Chinese diplomacy in Africa. Indeed, it is the persistence of its use and the concurrent claim of a continuity of underlying purpose that marks Chinese foreign policy out from western approaches which have by and large been content to avoid discussions of the past (for obvious reasons) or insisting on any policy continuities. However, beneath the platitudes of solidarity is a reading of Chinese historical relations with Africa emanating from Beijing that is, as any student of contemporary African history will know, at times at odds with the historical record of Chinese involvement on the continent. This article will examine the use and meaning of history in the construction of China's Africa policy. It will do so through first, a brief discussion of the relationship between foreign policy, identity and history; second, a survey of Chinese foreign policy towards Africa from 1955 to 1996; third, an analysis of the implications of Beijing's approach for its efforts to achieve foreign policy aims regionally and globally.

This article examines the challenges faced by Beijing in managing this increasingly complex relationship, reflecting upon the structural factors that encourage harmony and introduce discord in China-Africa ties. It examines how various policy solutions being considered by China, ranging from increasing participants in the policy-making process to tentative engagement with international development regimes, may still not address the most difficult issues involving adverse reactions to the Chinese presence from African civil societies and political opposition groups. In particular the lack of a strong civil society inside China inhibits the ability of its policy makers to draw on the expertise of the kind of independent pressure groups and NGOs that are available to traditional donor/ investor states. The article concludes by asking how the Chinese system can make up for these weaknesses without moving further towards the existing models and practices of the developed countries. 563

South Africa, the continental economic giant and self‐appointed spokesman for African development, is finding its distinctive national voice. Emboldened by the invitation to join the BRICS grouping, its membership of the G20 and a second term on the UN Security Council, Pretoria is beginning to capitalize on the decade of continental and global activism undertaken by Thabo Mbeki to assume a position of leadership. Gone is the defensive posturing which characterized much of the ANC's post‐apartheid foreign policy, replaced by an unashamed claim to African leadership. The result is that South Africa is exercising a stronger hand in continental affairs, ranging from a significant contribution to state‐building in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, to an unprecedented assertiveness on Zimbabwe. But this new assertiveness remains constrained by three factors: the unresolved issue of identity, a host of domestic constraints linked to material capabilities and internal politics, and the divisive continental reaction to South African leadership. These factors continue to inhibit the country's ability to translate its international ambitions and global recognition into a concrete set of foreign policy achievements.