A primary objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to bolster public confidence in the U.S. capital markets. The SEC aims to achieve this objective in part by regulating the use of alternate earnings measures (colloquially referred to as “pro forma” earnings) that differ from generally accepted accounting principles. This paper examines whether firms change their reporting practice in response to pro forma regulation. Specifically, it examines whether the use, calculation, and presentation of pro forma measures by S&P 500 companies changes between 2001 and 2003. We document three significant shifts in pro forma reporting in this period. First, the proportion of firms reporting pro forma earnings declines from 77 to 54 percent. Second, by 2003, pro forma is used in a less biased manner. Not only is the proportion of firms using pro forma earnings to increase reported income smaller than in 2001, but also the magnitudes of these increases are reduced. Third, in 2003, firms present pro formas in press releases in a much less prominent and less potentially misleading manner. These results suggest a strong impact of the recent regulation of pro forma reporting and provide important empirical evidence for policy makers.

In two articles, the first published in 1997 in the Journal of Accounting and Economics and the second in 1999 in this journal, Gary Biddle, Robert Bowen, and James Wallace presented evidence that reported earnings are more closely related than EVA to marketadjusted stock returns- in other words, that earnings are more "value relevant" than EVA. These papers, which are among the most widely cited in finance and accounting, fundamentally affected perceptions about the importance of EVA as a measure of corporate performance. 2004 Morgan Stanley.

This study compares managers' voluntary disclosure of pro forma earnings—an alternative measure to generally accepted accounting principals (GAAP) earnings—in the U.S. and Canada. The results indicate some distinct differences between the two countries in that U.S. managers (1) disclose pro forma earnings more frequently, (2) place greater emphasis on the pro forma earnings number relative to the GAAP earnings figure, and (3) make greater (income-increasing) adjustments from GAAP in calculating pro forma earnings than do their Canadian counterparts. While we find distinct differences in the use of pro forma between the U.S. and Canada, we do not find evidence that it is used for different purposes. Our evidence suggests that in both countries pro forma earnings is used by some corporations to affect users' perceptions of firm performance. Overall, given the differences in managers' use of pro forma, a form of voluntary disclosure, our results suggest caution in moving to a uniform (cross-border) system of financial regulation.

This article explores whether pro forma earnings, GAAP earnings, and I/B/E/S earnings are value relevant and, more important, which in comparative terms has the greatest value relevance. In addition to using actual pro forma measures contained in earnings press releases of Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 firms, our design employs both traditional price and returns association models and incorporates both current and future measures of earnings. We find for the full period, 2000 through 2004, that all three earnings measures are value relevant. We further find that pro forma earnings are significantly more value relevant than Institutional Broker's Estimate System (I/B/E/S) earnings, which in turn are more value relevant than Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) earnings. These results are robust to several alternate model specifications as well as to controlling for measures of opportunistic reporting.

The Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act was passed in 2002 in response to various instances of corporate malfeasance. The Act, designed to protect investors, led to wide-ranging regulation over various actions of managers, auditors and investment analysts. Part of SOX, and the focus of this study, targeted the disclosure by firms of “pro formaâ€\x9D earnings, an alternate (from GAAP earnings), flexible and unaudited measure of firm performance. Specifically, SOX directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to craft regulation which would reduce – and preferably eliminate – any pro forma earnings disclosure which might be “misleadingâ€\x9D. Examining earnings press releases over a 3-year period, this study addresses three questions. Were firms disclosing pro forma in a potentially misleading manner, what was the nature of this potentially misleading disclosure, and did SOX affect the disclosure practices? We find the following. In 2001 (prior to SOX), 53 firms – over 10% of all U.S. S&P 500 firms – were disclosing pro forma earnings in a potentially misleading manner. This was being done most commonly by using traditional GAAP terminology (e.g., “net incomeâ€\x9D) in the press release headline to describe what was later in the press release revealed to be a pro forma amount (i.e., “net income excluding special itemsâ€\x9D). By 2003 (subsequent to the SEC regulation), potentially misleading disclosure practices were seen in less than 1% of the earnings press releases of S&P 500 firms. This significant reduction suggests that managers, prior to the regulation, were either careless in their pro forma reporting practice, or were intentionally – and unethically – attempting to mislead investors. Either way, we conclude that the SEC regulation was both necessary and effective. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006pro forma earnings, disclosure management, misleading, regulation,