Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance (CG) on chief executive officer compensation (CEO COMP) and pay–performance relationship (PPR) in Indian listed firms. Design/methodology/approach A sample of 196 companies listed on the S&P BSE 500 (Standard and Poor's Bombay Stock Exchange 500) Index has been analyzed using the panel (random effects) regression technique over the period 2010–2019. In addition, the system GMM technique was used to deal with the endogeneity issue. Findings The study found that block ownership and ownership concentration negatively impact COMP measures and PPR. Board size also had a negative direct and moderating impact on CEO COMP; however, the linkages were generally insignificant, especially for total pay. Similarly, outsider blockholders were found to be playing an insignificant role. Further, board independence positively influences COMP levels and PPR, though the results were mixed with respect to significance. Finally, CEO duality positively and significantly influences CEO COMP and PPR. A comparison before and after the new Indian Companies Act 2013 also revealed similar results, particularly in the after period. It suggests that the new legislative initiative was not effective enough in improving the CG and, hence, the alignment of pay with performance. Originality/value This study investigates the direct and moderating impact of CG on CEO COMP in the context of emerging economy India. Further, it makes a comparison before and after the introduction of the new governance reform, that is, the Indian Companies Act, 2013. Moreover, providing support to the entrenchment effect, the study reveals that large shareholders expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by not aligning CEO pay with performance, making agency problems graver in emerging economies like India.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of board characteristics on CEO turnover performance relationship (TPR) in Indian listed firms. Design/methodology/approach A subset of the Standard and Poor’s Bombay Stock Exchange 500 (S&P BSE 500) Index companies was analyzed over the period 2015–2019 using the logistic (fixed-effects) regression model. Findings It was found that a weak relationship exists between CEO turnover and firm performance. With respect to board characteristics, board size was found to have a significant role in strengthening the TPR. However, other characteristics, such as board independence, multiple directors, board meetings and board gender diversity, played no role in influencing the TPR. Research limitations/implications First, the study period is limited to five years, during which several sample firms did not face any CEO turnover event leading to small sample size. Second, this study considers only the board’s gender diversity, whereas other types of diversity are omitted. Third, this study does not differentiate between insider and professional CEOs. Practical implications The findings suggest that regulators should focus on the effective enforcement of laws to strengthen the TPR and improve the monitoring role of boards, particularly in emerging economies like India, which face type II agency problems in addition to traditional principal–agent conflict. The results also offer implications for corporations, investors and academic researchers, highlighting areas that need considerable attention pertaining to corporate governance. Originality/value This study discerns the impact of several board-related characteristics on the TPR, particularly after the introduction of the new Companies Act 2013 in the emerging economy of India, where it has not been explored extensively.