Police worldwide regularly review closed-circuit television (CCTV) evidence in investigations. This research found that London police experts who work in a full-time "Super-Recogniser Unit" and front line police identifiers regularly making suspect identifications from CCTV possessed superior unfamiliar face recognition ability and, with higher levels of confidence, outperformed controls at locating actors in a bespoke Spot the Face in a Crowd Test. Police were also less susceptible to change blindness errors and possessed higher levels of conscientiousness and lower levels of neuroticism and openness. Controls who took part in Spot the Face in a Crowd Test actor familiarisation training outperformed untrained controls, suggesting this exercise might enhance identification of persons of interest in real investigations. This research supports an accumulating body of evidence demonstrating that international police forces may benefit from deploying officers with superior face recognition ability to roles such as CCTV review, as these officers may be the most likely to identify persons of interest.

N.J. Mackintosh (2104). Associations and Propositions: The case for a dual-process account of learning in humans. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 108,. AbstractWe review evidence that supports the conclusion that people can and do learn in two distinct ways -one associative, the other propositional. No one disputes that we solve problems by testing hypotheses and inducing underlying rules, so the issue amounts to deciding whether there is evidence that we (and other animals) also rely on a simpler, associative system, that detects the frequency of occurrence of different events in our environment and the contingencies between them. There is neuroscientific evidence that associative learning occurs in at least some animals (e.g., Aplysia californica), so it must be the case that associative learning has evolved. Since both associative and propositional theories can in principle account for many instances of successful learning, the problem is then to show that there are at least some cases where the two classes of theory predict different outcomes. We offer a demonstration of cue competition effects in humans under incidental conditions as evidence against the argument that all such effects are based on cognitive inference. The latter supposition would imply that if the necessary information is unavailable to inference then no cue competition should occur. We then discuss the case of unblocking by reinforcer omission, where associative theory predicts an irrational solution to the problem, and consider the phenomenon of the Perruchet effect, in which conscious expectancy and conditioned response dissociate. Further discussion makes use of evidence that people will sometimes provide one solution to a problem when it is presented to them in summary form, and another when they are presented in rapid succession with trial-by trial information. We also demonstrate that people trained on a discrimination may show a peak shift (predicted by associative theory), but given the time and opportunity to detect the relationships between S+ and S-, show rule-based behaviour instead. Finally, we conclude by presenting evidence that research on individual differences suggests that variation in intelligence and explicit problem solving ability are quite unrelated to variation in implicit (associative) learning, and briefly consider the computational implications of our argument, by asking how both associative and propositional processes can be accommodated within a single framework for cognition.

Task-cuing experiments are usually intended to explore control of task-set. But when small stimulus sets are used, they plausibly afford learning of the response associated with a combination of cue and stimulus, without reference to tasks. In three experiments we presented the typical trials of a task-cuing experiment: a cue (colored shape) followed, after a short or long interval, by a digit to which one of two responses was required. In a "Tasks" condition, participants were (as usual) directed to interpret the cue as an instruction to perform either an odd/even or a high/low classification task. In a "CSR" condition, to induce learning of mappings between cue-stimulus compound and response, participants were: in Experiment 1, given standard task instructions and additionally encouraged to learn the CSR mappings; in Experiment 2, informed of all the CSR mappings and asked to learn them, without standard task instructions; in Experiment 3, required to learn the mappings by trial and error. The effects of a task switch, response congruence, preparation, and transfer to a new set of stimuli, differed substantially between the conditions in ways indicative of classification according to task rules in the Tasks condition, and retrieval of responses specific to stimulus-cue combinations in the CSR conditions. Qualitative features of the latter could be captured by an associative learning network. Hence associatively-based compound retrieval can serve as the basis for performance with a small stimulus set. But, when organisation by tasks is apparent, control via task-set selection is the natural and efficient strategy.Keywords: task-switching, task-cuing, associative learning, conditional discrimination, connectionist modeling Forrest Monsell & McLaren 3 Human behaviour is often attributed to two types of processing: a set of controlled, resource-limited, and effortful processes, and a complementary set of involuntary, resourceunlimited and effortless processes. These have been referred to as "cognitive" and "associative" (McLaren, Green & Mackintosh, 1994) or as "intentional" and "automatic" (Jacoby, 1991). Typically, processes at both levels are thought to operate simultaneously, with a degree of independence (see McLaren, Green and Mackintosh, 1994 for a statement of this position and Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond 2009;Shanks, 2010 for critical reviews of it). In this paper, we examine aspects of performance in a task-switching paradigm often assumed to index "executive" or "endogenous" control processes, and ask to what extent performance might instead be accounted for by associative learning.Reconfiguring one's mind to perform a different task, especially when the environment continues to afford the previous task, seems a paradigmatic case of a controlled (endogenous, top-down, voluntary) cognitive process. Task-switching experiments intended to exercise and measure task-set control have attracted considerable interest over the last two decades (see Kiesel et al 2010;Monsell, 2003;Vandierendonck, ...

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After the report was submitted to the coroner, the first author, Davis was subsequently funded by the European Commission in a collaboration with the Metropolitan Police Service. More recently, he has provided consultancy services via the University of Greenwich for international and national police forces. However, it is unlikely that any of these projects were funded as a result of this case report, and Davis has never received any financial payment for this consultancy work.