Among tool kits to combat the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, school closures are one of the most frequent non-pharmaceutical interventions. However, school closures bring about substantial costs, such as learning loss. To date, studies have not reached a consensus about the effectiveness of these policies at mitigating community transmission, partly because they lack rigorous causal inference. Here we assess the causal effect of school closures in Japan on reducing the spread of COVID-19 in spring 2020. By matching each municipality with open schools to a municipality with closed schools that is the most similar in terms of potential confounders, we can estimate how many cases the municipality with open schools would have had if it had closed its schools. We do not find any evidence that school closures in Japan reduced the spread of COVID-19. Our null results suggest that policies on school closures should be reexamined given the potential negative consequences for children and parents.

Do ministers face gender discrimination in their career paths after entering presidential cabinets? Departing from past studies, which find little evidence of gender discrimination in more established democracies in Europe and the Americas, we argue that political experience can have a gendered effect on cabinet careers in newer democracies outside the West. Using fixed effects and matching designs, we analyze original data on the careers of 1,374 ministers from all major presidential democracies in Asia. Investigating the patterns of “cabinet promotions,” where ministers transfer from their initial cabinet appointment to a higher-prestige post, we confirm the null direct effect of gender in this new context. However, we also find important gender differences based on political experience, which helps women’s upward mobility in cabinets more than men. The finding that pathways to higher office differ by gender adds to our understanding of women’s representation in society.

Most Americans are sorted into social networks that are largely politically homogeneous. A large body of political science research has explored the behavioral implications of being embedded in a politically homogeneous or heterogeneous network, but substantially less attention has been given to explaining why some people find themselves in politically homogeneous or heterogeneous social networks. In this article, we explore the psychological and physiological underpinnings of political network homogeneity. We use social network data from an original survey of 129 undergraduates paired with lab experimental evidence that measures individuals' physiological reactivity to an anticipated political discussion. Using our original survey and a separate nationally representative survey, we find suggestive evidence that individuals who are more socially anxious are more likely to share partisanship with their social network ties. Moreover, we find that individuals who experienced a greater increase in heart rate when anticipating a political discussion were more likely to be in homogeneous discussion networks, but we do not find a relationship between electrodermal activity and network homogeneity. Aversion to psychological and physiological discomfort induced by political discussions could contribute to social polarization in the American public.

How can incumbent governments benefit when they control the timing of elections? The conventional wisdom is that incumbents gain an advantage by timing elections to coincide with favorable economic conditions. An alternative mechanism that has received less attention is the element of surprise: the incumbent’s ability to exploit the opposition’s lack of election preparedness. I theorize and empirically test this surprise mechanism using candidate-level data from Japanese House of Representatives elections (1955–2017). The results show that in surprise elections, opposition parties recruit fewer, lower-quality candidates, spend less money campaigning, coordinate their candidates less effectively, and ultimately receive fewer votes and seats. Evidence from fixed effects models and exogenously timed by-elections further suggest that surprise matters more in shorter, competitive election campaigns and helps incumbents more with confronting inter-party as opposed to intra-party electoral competition. These findings add to our understanding of how strategic election timing can undermine electoral accountability.