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In an effort to increase transparency, the chair of the Federal Reserve now holds a press conference (PC) following some, but not all, Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements. Evidence from financial markets shows that investors lower their expectations of important decisions on days without PCs and that these announcements convey less price-relevant information. Correspondingly, we show that investors pay more attention to upcoming announcements with PCs. This coordination of attention can reduce welfare in models of the social value of public information. Consistent with theories of investor attention, the market risk premium is larger on days with PCs.

We construct macroeconomic attention indexes (MAI), which are new measures of attention to different macroeconomic risks, including unemployment and monetary policy. Individual MAI tend to increase around related announcements and following changes in related fundamentals. Further, bad news raises attention more than good news. For unemployment and FOMC, attention predicts announcement risk premiums and implied volatility changes with large economic magnitudes. Our findings support theories of endogenous attention and announcement risk premiums, while demonstrating future research directions, including that announcements can raise new concerns. Macroeconomic announcements are important not only for contents and timing but also for attention.

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