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ObjectiveThe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports that the upper bound of benefits from removing mercury emissions by U.S. power plants after implementing its Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) is $210 million per year. In contrast, Trasande et al. [Environ Health Perspect 113:590–596 (2005)] estimated that American power plants impose an economic cost of $1.3 billion due to mercury emissions. It is impossible to directly compare these two estimates for a number of reasons, but we are able to compare the assumptions used and how they affect the results.Data Sources and Data ExtractionWe use Trasande’s linear model with a cord/maternal blood ratio of 1.7 and calculate health effects to children whose mothers had blood mercury levels ≥ 4.84 μg/L.Data SynthesisWe introduce the assumptions that the U.S. EPA used in its Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) analysis and discuss the implications. Using this approach, it is possible to illustrate why the U.S. EPA assumptions produce a lower estimate.ConclusionsThe introduction of all the U.S. EPA assumptions, except for those related to discounting, decreases the estimated monetized impact of global anthropogenic mercury emissions in the Trasande model by 81%. These assumptions also decrease the estimated impact of U.S. sources (including power plants) by almost 97%. When discounting is included, the U.S. EPA assumptions decrease Trasande’s monetized estimate of global impacts by 88% and the impact of U.S. power plants by 98%.

a b s t r a c tIn this paper, we evaluate the influence of two environmental policy levers on emissions in the metal-finishing industry: a voluntary program-the Strategic Goals Program (SGP)-and the threat of formal regulation. While voluntary approaches are increasingly utilized as policy tools, the effectiveness of such programs is often questioned, and the impact of a voluntary program in tandem with a regulatory threat is not well understood. We examine the decision to participate in the SGP and, conditional on that decision, determine the effects that the SGP and regulatory threat had on facility emissions behavior. Participation in the program appears related to several forms of external pressure: the regulatory threat, industry trade association membership, the level of environmental giving in a state, and a number of neighborhood characteristics. However, over the entire study period, participation in the SGP yielded little, if any, additional reductions in emissions, while the regulatory threat is correlated with significant emission reductions by both participants and non-participants. Splitting our study period into two time periods reveals a more nuanced relationship between SGP participation and emissions behavior than is evident over the entire study period. While participants do not appear to take advantage of the program initially, they make greater strides in reducing emissions than non-participants in later years. The split sample results also indicate that both participants and non-participants react strongly to the initial threat of regulation and to an increase in its relative stringency.