To reveal the interaction and influence mechanism between emergency rescue entities, and to explore and optimize a cooperation mechanism of emergency rescue entities, a tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency rescue cooperation based on government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions was constructed. The stability of each game subject’s strategy choice was explored. Simulation analysis was applied to investigate the influence mechanism of key parameters on the evolution of the game subject’s strategy combination. The research results show that government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions have consistent political demands and rescue targets in emergency rescue cooperation. The game subjects are driving forces for each other to choose positive strategies. The game evolution process of the emergency cooperation model shows a “mobilization-coordination” feature. At the same time, the emergency capital stock formed based on trust relationships, information matching, and institutional norms between game subjects can promote the evolution of the game system toward (1,1,1). In addition, for government organizations with limited emergency resources, the average allocation of emergency resources is not the optimal solution for emergency rescue efficiency. However, it is easier to achieve the overall target of emergency rescue cooperation by investing limited emergency resources in key variables that match the on-site situation. On this basis, combined with the practice of emergency rescues in emergencies, countermeasures and solutions are proposed to optimize the mechanism and improve the efficiency of emergency rescue cooperation.
Compound disasters are highly complex and can involve different types of disasters. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, compound disasters of public health emergencies, accident disasters, and natural hazards have occurred frequently all over the world; therefore, it is important to establish effective compound disaster emergency collaboration networks. Thus, this study examined the 7 March building collapse in Quanzhou City as a case study. This case was a typical compound disaster involving a public health emergency and an accident disaster during COVID-19. Based on the network analysis, the overall response and dynamic characteristics of the emergency collaboration for compound disasters were examined in this study. A compound disaster emergency collaboration network (ECN) was constructed by identifying the interactional relationships between emergency organizations. After applying time slices, the dynamic evolution of network structure, organizational–functional relations, organizational attributes, and cross-organizational relationships were discussed. The research results showed the following: (1) The density and connectivity of the compound disaster ECN first decreased before increasing. Meanwhile, the evolution of the network structure followed a path from decentralized to concentrated and from being uneven to an equilibrium. (2) The characteristics and practices of compound disasters during different periods indicated varied emergency needs for emergency organizations. We found that the formation of emergency tasks not only involved the passive adaptation to match the practice for compound disasters, but also the active choices of emergency organizations when facing compound disasters according to their collective experiences and decisions. (3) The national emergency management departments, the government emergency rescue organizations, and the local governments were the core organizations of the ECN. Public health management departments and social organizations were also required to participate in the ECN to improve the diverse and heterogeneous distribution of resources. (4) With increased demands during a compound disaster emergency, the number of cross-organizational collaborative relationships gradually increased. This study explored compound disaster emergencies from the perspective of network analysis to improve our understanding of the current and developing organizational relationships and practices during a compound disaster event. The dynamic characteristics of compound disasters require efficient adaptation and improvements of the collaborative mechanisms involved during emergencies.
Digital government construction is a complex system project, and data sharing is its governance niche. Cross-sectoral data sharing is the core issue of improving governance capacity in the construction of digital governments. Aimed at the dilemma of insufficient data sharing across departments, according to evolutionary game theory (EGT), we refined the game relationship between the data management department and the different government functional departments participating in cross-department data sharing. We used white Gaussian noise as a random perturbation, constructed a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model, analyzed the stability of the stochastic game system and studied the influence of the main parameters on the evolution of the game system with the help of numerical simulation. The results show that there exists a positive stable point in the process of cross-department data sharing. The external effect of data sharing can be improved by enhancing the investment in data sharing by government functional departments. The accumulation of interagency trust relationships can gradually eliminate the differences in data sharing among different departments. The coordination mechanism of government data sharing and the construction of the “good and bad reviews” system can form an internal and external adjustment mechanism for functional departments and the data management department and can promote multiple departments to participate in cross-department data sharing more actively.
Social organizations have become an important component of the emergency management system by virtue of their heterogeneous resource advantages. It is of great significance to explore the interaction between the local government and social organizations and to clarify the key factors affecting the participation of social organizations in natural hazard emergency responses. With the aim of exploring the relationship between the local government and social organizations, based on evolutionary game theory, the emergency incentive game model and the emergency linkage game model of natural hazard emergency responses were constructed. The evolutionary trajectories of the emergency incentive game system and the emergency linkage game system were described by numerical simulation. Meanwhile, the influence mechanism of government decision parameters on the strategy selection of both game subjects was analyzed. The results show that both governmental incentive strategy and linkage strategy can significantly improve the enthusiasm of social organizations for participating in natural hazard emergency responses. Moreover, they could encourage social organizations to choose a positive participation strategy. Nevertheless, over-reliance on incentives reduces the probability of the local government choosing a positive emergency strategy. In addition, we found that, when both game subjects tend to choose a positive strategy, the strategy selection of the local government drives that of social organizations.
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